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Blockbuster punitive damages awards, i.e., those awards exceeding
$100 million, attract attention based on their sheer size. While there have
been fewer such awards in the last decade, they remain an important pres-
ence in the legal landscape. Taking notice of these and other large punitive
damages awards, courts and state policymakers have taken steps to both
constrain them and render them more predictable. States have enacted pu-
nitive damages caps to limit the amount of punitive damages courts can
award, but these caps often contain a number of exceptions and apply only
to damages under a specific state's law. At a broader level, the Supreme
Court has announced ageneral limitation on punitive damages under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to all
cases and contains few exceptions. Under State Farm v. Campbell, punitive
damages awards that exceed the accompanying compensatory award by
more than afactor often will generally violate due process. This limit, how-
ever, is substantially higher than the punitive damages caps that some
states have put in place.
This Article provides the first empirical analysis of the effect of state
punitive damages caps on blockbuster awards and offers the first compari-
son of the effect of these reforms with the effect of the Supreme Court's
current constitutional doctrine on punitive damages. Understanding the
roles of these legal regimes in how the largest punitive damages awards
are imposedprovides unique insight into how diferent factors affect courts'
decisions to award punitive damages. Relying on this insight, as well as
previously developed empirical evidence, we argue that it is time for a new
constitutional doctrine on punitive damages. In particular, we argue that
the Supreme Court should incorporate the lessons learned from the difer-
ent effects of state punitive damages caps to lower the limit placed on pu-
nitive damages under the Due Process Clause. For cases involving finan-
cial loss, punitive awards that are more than three times the size of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Hugh F. Culverhouse Jr. School of Law at the University of Alabama. We
wish to thank participants at the Southern Economic Association Annual Meeting for helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this Article.
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accompanying compensatory award will generally violate due process. For
cases involving severe injuries, such as wrongful deaths, the total value of
punitive damages and compensatory damages hould not exceed economic
estimates of the value of a statistical ife, which is an economic deterrence
measure. This proposed structure would better achieve the Court's goal of
returning predictability to punitive damages awards, blockbuster and oth-
erwise.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Talcum powder is a remarkably common substance. Whether applying it as
part of an infant's care routine, having it brushed on following a haircut, or using
it in hundreds of other ways, talcum powder has been an important presence in
American life for many years. As such, it may have been surprising that a Cali-
fornia jury awarded $347 million in punitive damages to punish Johnson & John-
son for failing to warn consumers about the links between talcum powder and
172 [Vol. 2019
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cancer.' While such a large punitive damages award-accompanying, in this
case, a $70 million compensatory damages award2-may be unusual, such ex-
treme awards are not unprecedented. In fact, while this award would qualify as a
"blockbuster punitive damages award" because it exceeds $100 million, it does
not even rank among the forty largest punitive damages awards.3 Even if the
award had been ten times its current size, the talcum powder award would still
not make the top five punitive damages awards.
Because of their extreme size and their concomitant ability to influence the
behavior of potential defendants, blockbuster awards such as the talcum powder
award have received substantial attention from courts, policymakers, and schol-
ars.4 While these awards may be justified as necessary to punish particularly rep-
rehensible conduct and deter its repetition in the future, courts have expressed
concern over the predictability of punitive damages awards in general because
imposing large awards on defendants with little prior warning undermines
"[e]lementary notions of fairness."5 In an effort to preserve these notions of fair-
ness and return a degree of predictability to punitive damages, the Supreme Court
has on several occasions addressed punitive damages awards under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 Currently, the Court's constitutional
doctrine on punitive damages centers around a limit on the ratio between punitive
damages and compensatory damages announced in State Farm v. Campbell.7
There, the Court held that "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy
1. Richard Winton, L.A. Jury Hits Johnson & Johnson with $417-Million Verdict over Cancer Link to its
Talc, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2017, 2:50 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-cancer-talc-verdict-
20170821-story.html. The Los Angeles Superior Court later granted the defendant's motion for a new trial based
on a lack of specific causation with respect to the alleged injuries. Joe Mullin, Judge Overturns $417M Verdict
Over Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 24, 2017, 4:58 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2017/10/judge-overtums-417m-verdict-over-johnson-johnson-baby-powder/. After the California case, a
Missouri jury imposed a $4.69 billion punitive damages award on Johnson & Johnson based on findings that its
talc-based baby powder products contained asbestos, which caused women to develop ovarian cancer. Tina Bel-
lon, Jury Orders J&Jto Pay $4.7 Billion in Missouri Asbestos Cancer Case, REUTERS (July 12, 2018, 3:38 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-johnson-johnson-cancer-lawsuit/jury-orders-jj-to-pay-550-million-in-mis-
souri-asbestos-cancer-case-idUSKBN1 K234U.
2. Winton, supra note 1.
3. Any punitive damages award exceeding $100 million qualifies as a "blockbuster award." For previous
work on blockbuster awards and the coining of the "blockbuster punitive damages award" designation, see Alison
F. Del Rossi & W. Kip Viscusi, The Changing Landscape ofBlockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 12 AM. L.
ECON. REv. 116 (2010); Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 33
J.L. STUD. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Hersch & Viscusi, Punitive Damages]; W. Kip Viscusi & Benjamin J. McMi-
chael, Shifting the Fat-Tailed Distribution ofBlockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 11 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD.
350, 363-64 (2014) [hereinafter Viscusi & McMichael, Shifting the Fat-Tailed Distribution]; W. Kip Viscusi,
The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53 EMORY L.J. 1405 (2004).
4. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346(2007) (representing one instance of an appel-
late analysis of a blockbuster award); Viscusi & McMichael, Shifting the Fat-Tailed Distribution, supra note 3,
at 363 (analyzing the fat tailed distributions of blockbuster awards).
5. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996).
6. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991).
7. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425-26.
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due process."8 Effectively, the Court held that the ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages could not exceed 10:1.9
Beyond the Court's attempts to rein in large punitive damages awards, in-
dividual states have taken legislative action by capping punitive damages at a
specific dollar amount or at a multiple of the accompanying compensatory
award.10 These caps are often set much lower than the ratio limit imposed in State
Farm, placing stricter limits on punitive awards. For example, Colorado allows
a ratio of no more than 1:1.11 However, unlike the Court's limit, which applies
to any punitive damages award imposed in the United States, state caps apply
only to cases under a specific state's law (and sometimes only to a subset of
cases). 12 Also, unlike the Court's limit, state caps often contain specific excep-
tions that allow courts to impose awards in excess of the cap amount.13
In general, State Farm and punitive damages caps have different strengths
and weaknesses, and the differential impact of these two legal regimes on puni-
tive damages awards can elucidate which factors are most salient in both limiting
punitive damages awards and rendering them more predictable. There is very
little empirical evidence, however, on the comparative effect of these two re-
gimes.14 Importantly, no prior work has examined the impact of punitive dam-
ages caps on the punitive damages awards most likely to violate notions of fair-
ness or otherwise attract attention-the blockbuster awards. The principal
contributions of this Article are to provide the first empirical evidence on the
effect of punitive damages caps on blockbuster awards as well as evidence on
the comparative effects of caps and the ratio limit announced in State Farm.
Estimating a series of multivariate regression models, we analyze the effect
of both State Farm and punitive damages caps to find that, consistent with their
different structures, they have different restraining effects on blockbuster
awards. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that State Farm has reduced both
the frequency with which punitive awards over $100 million have been imposed
8. Id. at 425; see also id. ("When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only
equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.").
9. Because the Court offered no specific numbers, the most conservative interpretation ofthe "single digit
ratio" is 10:1 because, technically, 9.99 is a single digit and 9.99 = 10. See id. ("Single-digit multipliers are
more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the State's goals of deterrence and retribution, than
awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1[.]").
10. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-240b (2015) (limiting punitive damages to twice the amount of com-
pensatory damages); IND. CODE § 34-51-3-4 (2018) (limiting punitive damages to the greater of $50,000 or three
times the compensatory award).
11. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (2018). This ratio increases to 3:1 in limited circumstances. Id.
12. See, e.g., State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
13. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 768.73, 768.735, 768.736 (2018) (allowing the cap on punitive damages to
increase in specific situations).
14. To date, some work has independently evaluated punitive damages caps and State Farm, but only one
study has examined the two regimes together. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Judge-Jury Dif
ference in Punitive Damages Awards: Who Listens to the Supreme Court?, 8 J. EMPtUCAL L. STUD. 325,346-52
(2011) (examining the effect of State Farm on a national sample of punitive damages awards). But see Benjamin
J. McMichael & W. Kip Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus: The Differential Incidence of State Punitive
Damages Reforms, 84 S. ECON. J. 82, 93 (2017) [hereinafter McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damage Cal-
culus] (studying the effect of punitive damages caps and State Farm in the same empirical models).
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as well as the size of those blockbuster awards that are imposed. In contrast, the
findings reported here indicate that punitive damages caps only have an effect on
the frequency of these awards, suggesting that their effect is limited to preventing
awards from crossing the $100 million threshold (i.e., having no effect on the
size of the awards that cross this threshold). Interestingly, this evidence contrasts
somewhat with prior empirical evidence derived from a national sample of puni-
tive damages awards, i.e., a sample of "typical" awards.15 This earlier evidence
suggests that State Farm has little effect on either the frequency with which pu-
nitive damages are imposed or the size of these awards, while caps have a statis-
tically significant and negative impact on award size.16
This contrast in empirical findings provides a unique opportunity to con-
sider which aspects of a limitation on punitive damages are most effective. In
particular, the effect of State Farm on large awards (and the absence of an effect
on small awards) and the effect of caps on small awards (with less of an effect
on large awards) offers insight into how the Supreme Court might refine its cur-
rent doctrine on punitive damages to better achieve its goal of rendering these
awards more predictable. And we argue that, if the Court takes this goal of re-
straining such outlier awards seriously, it should take advantage of the available
empirical evidence to formulate a new approach to governing punitive damages
under the Due Process Clause. By lowering the current ratio limit from 10:1 to
3:1 for damages relating to financial harm, the Court could maintain the current
doctrine's efficacy in limiting large awards but better restrain (and thus render
more predictable) smaller punitive damages awards in the same way state puni-
tive damages caps do. For damages pertaining to fatalities and serious bodily
injuries, a total damages cap based on the value of a statistical life can serve as
the pertinent deterrence-based measure of damages. To be sure, limiting punitive
damages will decrease the penalties for purposes of punishing and deterring rep-
rehensible behavior, but the Court has made clear that it is willing to trade off
punishment and deterrence for predictability.'7 And, from the standpoint of de-
terrence, the pertinent objective should be to provide economically efficient lev-
els of deterrence that are commensurate with the magnitude of the harms. Taking
seriously the Court's statements on predictability, then, we offer new insight
based on empirical evidence into how the Court may better achieve predictability
in punitive damages.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II engages with the
legal and economic theories of punitive damages, as well as the existing evidence
as to the predictability of these awards. Part III discusses the 137 blockbuster
awards we have found, including many that have not been identified in previous
15. McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 93-95. By "typical," we
mean awards that are imposed in a large sample of all case types. We do not mean to imply that punitive damages
are at all typical. Indeed, they are imposed in less than 5% of all cases. Id. at 92.
16. Id. at 94.
17. We do not offer a normative argument that limiting the ability of punitive damages to punish and deter
reprehensible conduct is, on balance, best for society. Instead, we argue that, if the goal is to increase predicta-
bility, our proposal can achieve that goal.
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studies. Part IV provides the first empirical analysis of the effect of punitive dam-
ages caps on these awards and offers a comparison between this effect and the
impact of State Farm. Part V analyzes this evidence along with prior evidence to
arrive at a specific suggestion for how the Court can update the current punitive
damages doctrine to better achieve its goal of predictability, while maintaining
meaningful economic sanctions.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: THEORY, FRAMEWORK, AND EVIDENCE
Punitive damages occupy a unique place in the United States legal system.
Unlike compensatory damages, punitive damages do not exist to compensate in-
jured parties.18 While they are not equivalent to full criminal sanctions,9 punitive
damages, as their name suggests, exist to punish reprehensible conduct.2 0 They
also have a general deterrence role by serving to deter others from engaging in
similar conduct in the future.21 They accomplish these twin goals by forcing de-
fendants to internalize costs associated with their actions above and beyond the
amount required to compensate victims. The Supreme Court has explicitly lim-
ited punitive damages to these goals.2 2 But before detailing the legal framework
in which punitive damages are awarded, we examine the means by which they
accomplish the goals of punishment and deterrence. Specifically, we review the
economic theory of punitive damages, which clarifies how punitive damages
function in the legal system.
A. The Roles ofPunitive Damages: The Economic Theory
The manner in which punitive damages accomplish the goal of punishment
is straightforward. Defendants would obviously prefer to pay less in damages,
and by increasing award amounts, courts can punish defendants. The manner in
which punitive damages accomplish the goal of deterrence, however, is not as
straightforward. The key to understanding the role of punitive damages in deter-
rence is appreciating that not every wrongdoer is held liable for his or her ac-
tions.23 Because of this, these wrongdoers may engage in conduct that is harmful
18. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) ("[Punitive damages]
operate as 'private fines' intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing.").
19. See id. (noting that punitive damages "have been described as 'quasi-criminal"'); see also Pac. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
20. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) ("[Punitive damages] are not compensation for
injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future
occurrence.").
21. Id.; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) ("Punitive damages may properly
be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.").
22. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
23. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 IHARV. L.
REV. 869, 888 (1998) (explaining reasons wrongdoers escape liability for their actions). See generally STEVEN
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 244 (2004) (explaining how punitive damages ac-
count for the probability that a wrongdoer will not be caught).
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to others because it simply "isn't worth it" to take the precautions necessary to
avoid harming others.
For example, suppose Chemicorp, Inc., manufactures chemicals for use in
industrial processes. In so doing, it produces harmful byproducts that it can either
store onsite or safely dispose of through a special procedure, which converts the
byproducts into harmless substances. Chemicorp has not invested the $5 million
necessary to buy the equipment required to complete the safe disposal procedure
and is currently deciding whether to do so. Chemicorp knows that if it stores the
byproducts onsite, they will eventually leak out of their containment vessels and
cause $10 million worth of harm to the surrounding community-though, it
keeps this knowledge a closely guarded secret. Given the nature of the harm and
the nuances of the legal system, Chemicorp knows that it faces only a 40%
chance of liability for this $10 million harm.24
Thus, Chemicorp faces the following investment decision with respect to
the safe disposal procedure. It can pay the $5 million necessary to begin the safe
disposal procedure or it can roll the dice that it will not be held liable for the $10
million harm it knows will eventually occur if it stores the byproducts onsite.
The expected cost of this gamble is only $4 million since there is only a 40%
chance that Chemicorp will be required to compensate the victims.25 Comparing
the $5 million cost of investing in the safe disposal procedure with the $4 million
expected cost of storing the harmful byproducts onsite, Chemicorp's profit-max-
imizing choice is clear-store the products onsite, despite this resulting in a $10
million harm to the surrounding community.
While this choice is clear from Chemicorp's perspective, it is equally
clearly the wrong choice from society's perspective. By investing $5 million in
the safe disposal procedure, Chemicorp could avoid a $10 million harm to soci-
ety. From a social perspective, Chemicorp could generate $5 million in value for
society by paying $5 million to avoid a harm of $10 million. The problem, of
course, is that Chemicorp does not compare $10 million to $5 million but the $4
million expected cost of liability to the $5 million certain cost of investing. From
the perspective of deterrence, the legal system's job is to align Chemicorp's in-
centives with those of society's so that it makes the right social choice. Yet by
only awarding compensatory damages-here $10 million-if Chemicorp is held
liable, courts cannot force Chemicorp to internalize the full cost of the harm it is
imposing on society. Chemicorp will always discount the compensatory damages
by the probability that it is held liable for those damages, so the legal system
essentially has two options to increase Chemicorp's cost of storing the byprod-
ucts onsite-increase the probability of being held liable or increase the damages
Chemicorp must pay if it is held liable.
The first option (increasing the probability of liability) may be feasible in
the criminal context where the legal system may be able to increase policing or
24. This 40% chance could be due to the difficulty in tracing any harm to Chemicorp's actions. Perhaps
the byproducts cause types of cancer that are both difficult to detect and difficult to trace to the byproduct.
25. More specifically, the expected cost is the cost of being held liable ($10 million) discounted by the
probability of being held liable (40%), and 0.4 * ($10,000,000) = $4,000,000.
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prosecution efforts. But increasing the probability in the civil context is more
difficult, as private actors maintain responsibility for enforcement.26 Thus, the
legal system has turned to the second option to align Chemicorp's incentives with
those of society by increasing the damages it must pay if it is held liable. Punitive
damages fulfill this role by increasing the cost of being held liable for
Chemicorp. In this example, punitive damages of $15 million would be required
to perfectly align Chemicorp's incentives with those of society. If Chemicorp is
held liable, it will pay $10 million in compensatory damages and $15 million in
punitive damages for a total of $25 million. Multiplying this total by the 40%
chance of being held liable, Chemicorp faces an expected cost of $10 million by
storing its byproducts onsite, which is exactly the cost it imposes on society by
doing so.
The economic theory of punitive damages is a generalization of the above
example.2 7 Suppose that a defendant will be held liable with probability p and
will pay compensatory damages of CD if it is held liable. Thus, the expected cost
of liability is p * CD. Assuming that he compensatory damages capture the harm
imposed on society as a result of the defendant's actions as they should, this
defendant's incentives to avoid potentially harmful actions are not aligned with
those of society since it discounts the cost of the harm by the probability of being
held liable. To realign the defendant's incentives with those of society, a court
can impose punitive damages of PD, meaning that the defendant pays CD + PD
if it is held liable and faces an expected liability cost of p * (CD + PD).
To perfectly realign the incentives of the defendant with those of society,
the court should impose the amount of punitive damages that forces the defend-
ant's expected liability costs to equal the costs it imposes on society, i.e.,
p * (CD + PD) = CD. Rearranging this equation, we can derive a simple for-
mula for the amount of punitive damages required to force the defendant to in-
ternalize the full amount of the cost it imposes on society:
PD = ((1 - p)/p) * CD. In other words, the amount of punitive damages nec-
essary to properly align the defendant's incentives is the amount of compensa-
tory damages in the case multiplied by an amount that depends on the probability
of being held liable.2 8 Law and economics scholars have extended this simple
theory of punitive damages in numerous ways.2 9 A full review of these detailed
26. See Steven R Salbu, Developing Rational Punitive Damages Policies: Beyond the Constitution, 49
FLA. L. REV. 247,276-77 (1997) (describing the role of punitive damages in encouraging private litigants to hold
wrongdoers accountable); see, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 511 (2008) (discussing enforce-
ment by a private actor).
27. Our discussion of the economic theory of punitive damages closely follows that provided by SHAVELL
supra note 23, at 243-47 and Hersch & Viscusi, Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 3-4. See also Polinsky &
Shavell, supra note 23, at 887-96 (offering an in-depth discussion of the theory of punitive damages).
28. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 23, at 874 ("When an injurer has a chance of escaping liability, the
proper level of total damages to impose on him, if he is found liable, is the harm caused multiplied by the recip-
rocal of the probability of being found liable.").
29. See, e.g., Yasuhiro Ikeda & Daisuke Mori, Can Decoupling Punitive Damages Deter an Injurer's
Harmful Activity?, 11 REv. L. EcoN. 513, 513 (2015) (developing a model in which punitive damages are de-
coupled so that they are paid into a state-administered system instead of to plaintiffs).
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mathematical extensions is beyond the scope of this Article, but the simple equa-
tion above captures the essence of the theory.
The amount of punitive damages captured in the above equation is often
referred to as the "optimal" amount of punitive damages because it results in the
"optimal" deterrence of the defendant.30 The amount is optimal because it per-
fectly aligns the defendant's expected costs of liability with the costs it imposes
on society.31 If the amount of punitive damages were smaller, then some defend-
ants, facing liability costs that are too low, will engage in harmful conduct be-
cause they do not face the full costs of that conduct. This case of under-deterrence
is essentially what happened in the Chemicorp example. On the other hand, if
the amount of punitive damages were greater, then some defendants will fail to
engage in conduct that would benefit society.
For example, consider a power plant that-like many power plants-emits
pollution as a byproduct of producing electricity. This pollution is harmful, but
if courts impose punitive damages beyond those necessary to force the power
plant to internalize the costs of pollution (and take measures to mitigate its pol-
luting activities accordingly), the power plant may simply decide to stop produc-
ing electricity altogether because the liability costs are too high. In this case, local
residents may find themselves facing much higher prices for electricity that must
be purchased from other, more distant, power plants. Scholars often refer to this
case of over-deterrence as a chilling effect,3 2 as the power plant fails to engage
in socially beneficial activities because of excess liability costs.
In general, courts must engage in a delicate balancing game when awarding
the optimal amount of punitive damages to avoid under- or over-deterring de-
fendants. This game is made more difficult by the facts that compensatory dam-
ages often do not perfectly capture the harm imposed on society for a variety of
reasons-e.g., the jury cannot effectively calibrate compensatory damages to the
harm suffered by the plaintiffs-and that the probability of being held liable is
generally unknown, difficult to estimate, and of little interest to courts (beyond
its role in ascertaining punitive damages).33 Moreover, the role of punitive dam-
ages in punishing defendants could conflict with their role of deterring behavior,
making optimal deterrence more difficult to achieve.3 4 Compounding the com-
plicated role punitive damages play in the legal system is the requirement that
defendants not only be able to ascertain the costs of their conduct and the prob-
ability of liability (as required in the economic theory of punitive damages)
35 but
30. Hersch & Viscusi, Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 3.
31. Id. at 3-4.
32. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 23, at 962 n.36 ("Obviously, any damages imposed on such a party are
excessive and will chill participation in activities in which such mistakes occur.").
33. See Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as Risk Man-
ager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 902 (1998).
34. For example, a defendant may engage in particularly reprehensible conduct that society deems worthy
of harsh punishment, but the probability of liability for that conduct may be high. In that case, the punishment
rationale for punitive damages would require a greater amount of damages than the deterrence rationale. A similar
tension arises if the probability of liability is low and the conduct is not deemed worthy of punishment.
35. See infra Section H.A.
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predict how courts will determine these costs and probability. If defendants can-
not effectively predict what their punitive damages will be in the event of liabil-
ity, then the value of these damages in deterring defendants is diminished since
defendants will make decisions based on erroneous expectations of damages.
The difficulty of calibrating punitive damages to achieve their goals does
not undermine the theoretical conclusion that awarding punitive damages can be
optimal in many cases. It has, however, led the Supreme Court and state govern-
ments to impose certain controls that address the practical problems inherent in
awarding punitive damages. The next Section reviews the current legal frame-
work surrounding punitive damages.
B. Awarding Punitive Damages: Federal and State Law
Because of their unique role, the legal framework for awarding punitive
damages is quite different from that for compensatory damages. Both federal and
state law play a role in the imposition of punitive damages, but the bases of the
federal and state interventions into punitive damages awards stem from different
considerations. Federal requirements for punitive damages arise from the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and are primarily directed at pro-
tecting defendants from "grossly excessive" punitive damages.36 While this ob-
jective is effectively a concern about over-deterrence, state law interventions into
punitive damages awards are more explicit in their concern with over-deterrence.
Moreover, unlike the constitutional considerations that drive federal law require-
ments, state law interventions are generally driven by specific policy considera-
tions. We begin by examining the constitutional framework of punitive damages
before reviewing the policy concerns and specific state interventions into these
damages.
1. Fuzzy Math and the Constitutionality ofPunitive Damages
The Supreme Court has evaluated the constitutionality of punitive damages
under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments,3 7 and though it has always
held that punitive damages in general remain constitutional, it has imposed sev-
eral limitations on how they are awarded. Beginning with the Court's earlier for-
ays into this area, it held in United States v. Halper that no violation of the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment occurs when a defendant faces a
36. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1991).
37. The Court has also addressed questions concerning punitive damages under the Seventh Amendment.
These questions pertain, however, to issues of how federal appellate courts review punitive damages. See, e.g.,
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424,436 (2001) ("Our decisions in analogous cases,
together with the reasoning that produced those decisions, thus convince us that courts of appeals should apply a
de novo standard of review when passing on district courts' determinations of the constitutionality of punitive
damages awards."); see also, e.g., id at 437 ("Unlike the measure of actual damages suffered, which presents a
question of historical or predictive fact . .. the level of punitive damages is not really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury."
(quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 459 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
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civil award for punitive damages following criminal sanctions for the same con-
duct.38 The Court later held that punitive damages do not violate the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.39 In Browning-Ferris Industries of Ver-
mont v. Kelco Disposal, the Court held that the "Excessive Fines Clause does not
apply to awards of punitive damages in cases between private parties."40 The
Court noted that it had "never held, or even intimated, that the Eighth Amend-
ment serves as a check on the power of a jury to award damages in a civil case."41
Instead, the Eighth Amendment and the protections it provides are concerned
"with criminal process and with direct actions initiated by government to inflict
punishment.'42 The Court explained that "[a]wards of punitive damages do not
implicate these concerns"43 and therefore declined to restrict the imposition of
punitive damages under the Eighth Amendment."
Having declined to bar or even impose limitations on punitive damages un-
der the Fifth or Eighth Amendments, the Court subsequently reviewed punitive
damages awards under the Fourteenth Amendment.45 After skirting the question
of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in several cases,46 the Court first addressed a challenge to punitive damages
under the Due Process Clause in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip.47 Re-
viewing both state and federal jurisprudence, the Court concluded that nothing
in the common law method of imposing punitive damages-i.e., allowing the
jury to decide the amount of punitive damages to award-violated due process.48
Noting its "concern about punitive damages that 'run wild,"' however, the Court
considered whether the Due Process Clause imposes certain limits on punitive
damages, even if it does not bar their imposition altogether.49
38. 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989), abrogated by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) ("[N]othing in
today's opinion precludes a private party from filing a civil suit seeking damages for conduct that previously was
the subject of criminal prosecution and punishment. The protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not trig-
gered by litigation between private parties.").
39. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 259-60.
42. Id. at 260.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991).
46. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 276-77 (1989) (explaining that because a Fourteenth Amend-
ment challenge was not properly before the Court, that challenge "must await another day"); see also, e.g., Bank-
ers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87-89 (1988) ("Appellant has touched on a due process issue
that I think is worthy of the Court's attention in an appropriate case[; however,] . .. [t]his due process question,
serious as it is, should not be decided today.").
47. 499 U.S. at 15.
48. Id. at 17.
So far as we have been able to determine, every state and federal court that has considered the question has
ruled that the common law method for assessing punitive damages does not in itself violate due process. In
view of this consistent history, we cannot say that the common law method for assessing punitive damages
is so inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se unconstitutional.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
49. Id. at 18.
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Though the Court "[could] not draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit
every case" it could "say ... that general concerns of reasonableness and ade-
quate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury properly enter into
the constitutional calculus."s0 With respect to the punitive damages award in
Haslip, the Court concluded that state law appropriately cabined the discretion
of the jury so that punitive damages were "confined to deterrence and retribution,
the state policy concerns sought to be advanced."5 1 Reviewing the numerous fac-
tors that juries were required to consider under state law when awarding punitive
damages,52 the Court further concluded that "[t]he application of these stand-
ards ... impose[d] a sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the dis-
cretion of... factfinders in awarding punitive damages."5 3
The Supreme Court returned to the question of the constitutionality of pu-
nitive damages under the Fourteenth Amendment in TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp.5 4 The Court explained that certain awards may be so
"'grossly excessive' as to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment" and that a general concern of reasonableness underlies any inquiry
into whether a given award is grossly excessive.55 Examining the reasonableness
of the award in TXO, which was 526 times as large as the accompanying com-
pensatory damages award, the Court refused to hold that due process requires
any particular mathematical relationship between punitive and compensatory
damages.56 The Court explained that the award in TXO was not so unreasonable
to render it "grossly excessive" and, in doing so, endorsed the factors used by
different state courts to determine reasonableness without indicating which fac-
tors were most important among them.57
50. Id
51. Id. at 19.
52. See id. at 21-22.
It was announced that the following could be taken into consideration in determining whether the award
was excessive or inadequate: (a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages
award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually has
occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the duration of that conduct, the
defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the
profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of
having the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the "financial position" of the defendant; (e) all the costs of
litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in
mitigation; and (g) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the same conduct, these also
to be taken in mitigation.
Id.
53. Id. at 22.
54. 509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993).
55. Id. at 458.
56. Id. at 458-60.
57. Id. at 459-60 (endorsing the approaches used by the Alabama and West Virginia Supreme Courts in
determining the reasonableness of a particular punitive damages award). The Court further added that the size of
the potential harm to the plaintiff could be relevant in the reasonableness determination as well. Id. at 462.
Thus, even if the actual value of the "potential harm" to respondents is not between $5 million and $8.3
million, but is closer to $4 million, or $2 million, or even $1 million, the disparity between the punitive
award and the potential harm does not, in our view, "jar one's constitutional sensibilities."
Id. (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)).
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While the Court initially refused to develop a clear test for the reasonable-
ness of punitive damages awards in its early Fourteenth Amendment cases, it
reversed this course beginning with its decision in BMW ofNorth America, Inc.
v. Gore.5 8 In providing a more concrete test for whether an award was reasonable,
the Court in Gore held that the predictability of awards and the ability of defend-
ants to anticipate these awards underlies the constitutional protections against
"grossly excessive" punitive damages awards.59 Specifically, the Court ex-
plained that "[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional ju-
risprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that
will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State
may impose."60 The Court instantiated these elementary notions of fairness with
respect o punitive damages through three specific "guideposts" which determine
whether a particular punitive damages award is grossly excessive: (1) the "degree
of reprehensibility" of the defendant's conduct, (2) the "disparity between the
harm" caused by the defendant and the "punitive damages award," and (3) the
"difference between [the punitive damages award] and the civil penalties author-
ized or imposed in comparable cases."61
Noting that "the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a puni-
tive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's con-
duct,"62 the Court explained that the instant "case exhibit[ed] none of the circum-
stances ordinarily associated with egregiously improper conduct."63 Similarly,
noting that "exemplary damages must bear a 'reasonable relationship' to com-
pensatory damages," the Court recognized that the ratio of punitive to compen-
satory damages in this case was 500:1.6 Though still refusing to provide a
"mathematical formula" to "mark" the "constitutional line," the Court concluded
that the high punitive-to-compensatory ratio in this case failed to fall into the
constitutional range.65
Following Gore, courts had a clearer picture of what constituted an unrea-
sonable punitive damages award but still lacked clarity on what ratio of punitive
to compensatory damages represented the limits of reasonability. This would
change when the Supreme Court decided State Farm v. Campbell.66 In that case,
a Utah jury had awarded the plaintiffs $2.6 million in compensatory damages
58. 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) ("[W]e believe[ ] that a review of this case would help to illuminate 'the
character of the standard that will identify unconstitutionally excessive awards' of punitive damages." (internal
citations omitted)).
59. Id. at 574-75.
60. Id at 574.
61. Id. at 574-75.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 580.
64. Id. at 580, 582.
65. Id at 582.The Court also considered the third guidepost in reaching this conclusion. See id. at 583-84
("In this case the $2 million economic sanction imposed on BMW is substantially greater than the statutory fines
available in Alabama and elsewhere for similar malfeasance.").
66. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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and $145 million in punitive damages on claims of bad faith, fraud, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.67 The trial court reduced the compensatory
and punitive awards to $1 million and $25 million, respectively, but applying the
Supreme Court's decision in Gore, the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145
million punitive damages award.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the punitive damages
award in this case violated the Due Process Clause.6 9 In doing so, it reiterated its
"concern[] over the imprecise manner in which punitive damages systems are
administered."70 With this concern in mind, the Court applied the three Gore
guideposts. While the first and third guideposts were marginally helpful in this
case,7 1 the second guidepost was most relevant. Though the Court "decline[d]
again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot ex-
ceed," it held that "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due pro-
cess."72
While this holding leaves room for interpretation and, at best, represents a
fuzzy demarcation of constitutionality,73 this "single-digit" ratio remains the
clearest statement of the Court's approach to the constitutionality of punitive
damages awards. It is also the most relevant holding in terms of furthering the
Court's overall goal of maintaining predictability within punitive damages
awards. Defendants, who are likely better able to forecast specific economic
harms of their actions, can better predict punitive damages knowing that those
damages are limited (in most cases) to a specific multiple of a forecastable dollar
amount. This is not to suggest that the Court's approach is perfect, and it explic-
itly noted that other ratios may apply in certain circumstances.74
67. Id at 414-15.
68. Id at 415-16.
69. Id at 418 ("Under the principles outlined in BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore, this case is neither
close nor difficult. It was error to reinstate the jury's $145 million punitive damages award.").
70. Id at 417.
71. Under the first guidepost, the Court concluded that while the conduct at issue in State Farm was rep-
rehensible, it was not sufficiently reprehensible to support the punitive damages awarded. Id. at 419-20 ("While
we do not suggest there was error in awarding punitive damages based upon State Farm's conduct toward the
Campbells, a more modest punishment for this reprehensible conduct could have satisfied the State's legitimate
objectives, and the Utah courts should have gone no further."). The Court declined to "dwell long on [the third
Gore] guidepost" but noted that the Utah Supreme Court's "analysis [under this guidepost] was insufficient to
justify the [punitive damages] award." Id at 428.
72. Id at 425; see also id. ("When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only
equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.").
73. See id ("The precise award in any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and circumstances of
the defendant's conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.").
74. See id
Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damages award may not surpass, ratios
greater than those we have previously upheld may comport with due process where "a particularly egregious
act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages." . . .When compensatory damages are sub-
stantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of
the due process guarantee.
Id. (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996)).
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In contrast to the Court's somewhat fuzzy approach, the approaches of in-
dividual states in limiting punitive damages awards has been decidedly less so.
The next Subsection details state-specific interventions into punitive damages
awards.
2. Caps and Other State Interventions in Punitive Damages Awards
While a number of states have enacted caps on punitive damages awards,
their approaches have not been uniform. All caps place a clear limit on punitive
damages, but caps vary in the limiting number that is specified and in the per-
missiveness of the exceptions to their limitations.7 6 For example, North Carolina
has enacted a simple and clear punitive damages cap that prohibits the award of
damages in excess of "three times the amount of compensatory damages or two
hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), whichever is greater,"n with only one
exception.78 On the other hand, Florida has capped punitive damages at the
greater of $500,000 or three times the accompanying compensatory damages
award unless the defendant acted in an unreasonable manner.79 If the defendant
acted unreasonably, the cap increases to the greater of $2 million or four times
the accompanying compensatory damages award.80 Further, certain types of
claims are exempt from Florida's cap.81
In contrast to the federal limits on punitive damages, states have taken
measures beyond caps to limit punitive damages. For example, several states
have increased the burden of proof for punitive damages beyond a preponderance
of the evidence-the typical burden in civil trials. Georgia requires "clear and
convincing evidence" to support an award of punitive damages,82 and Colorado
requires plaintiffs to "prove[] beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of a
wrong" to support an award of punitive damages.83 Beyond increasing the evi-
dentiary standard plaintiffs must satisfy when seeking punitive damages, some
states have also increased the conduct standard for defendants from negligence
to gross negligence, recklessness, or malice.84 Finally, many states require (or
75. A comprehensive listing of all of the reforms enacted by states may be found in Ronen Avraham,
Database ofState Tort Law Reforms (5th) (Univ. Texas L., L. Econ Research Paper No. e555, 2014).
76. See, e.g., MISS. CODE § 11-1-65 (2018) (detailing a relatively complicated cap on punitive damages
that shifts based on the net worth of the defendant).
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25(b) (2018).
78. North Carolina allows an exception to the cap only in the case of driving while impaired. See id. § ID-
26 ("[The punitive damages cap] shall not apply to a claim for punitive damages for injury or harm arising from
a defendant's operation of a motor vehicle if the actions of the defendant in operating the motor vehicle would
give rise to an offense of driving while impaired.. .
79. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(l)(a) (2018).
80. Id. § 768.73(l)(b).
81. Id. §§ 768.735-36.
82. GA. CODEANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (2018).
83. COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127(2) (2018).
84. See e.g., GA. CODE § 51-12-5.1(b) (2018) ("Punitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions
in which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions showed willful misconduct,
malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of eare which would raise the presumption of conscious
indifference to consequences."); MISS. CODE. § 1 1-1-65(1)(a) (2018) ("Punitive damages may not be awarded if
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allow litigants to request) bifurcated trials such that the decision of whether to
award punitive damages (and how much to award) occur in a separate phase from
the trial determining the defendant's liability for compensatory damages.85
Collectively, these reforms, while not placing a firm limit on punitive dam-
ages, reduce the chances that plaintiffs are able to successfully establish that pu-
nitive damages are warranted in a given case or, if damages are imposed, de-
crease the amount of damages that are awarded. Thus, these reforms play some
role in furthering the goal of rendering punitive damages awards more predicta-
ble, consistent with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area. Whether pu-
nitive damages awards are actually predictable, however, remains an open ques-
tion, and the next Section discusses the robust body of empirical evidence that
has been developed on this question.
C. Are Punitive Damages Predictable?: The Existing Evidence
As noted by Mitchell Polinsky, there are two components of predictability
with respect to punitive damages: (1) whether punitive damages will be imposed;
and (2) if they are imposed, what amount will be awarded.86 In early work, The-
odore Eisenberg and other scholars examined both of these components, analyz-
ing a dataset of punitive damages awards from 1991 and 1992.7 With respect to
whether an award will be imposed, they found empirical evidence "suggest[ing]
a difficulty in predicting, based on available data, in precisely which cases puni-
tive damages will be awarded."88 With respect to the amount of damages im-
posed, however, the Eisenberg group concluded that punitive damages are, to
some extent, predictable. Specifically, they found that "compensatory damages
explain about 47 percent of the variance in punitive damages awards," i.e., higher
compensatory damages awards predict higher punitive damages awards and ex-
plain much of the observed variation in punitive damages.89 Based on this, the
the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages
are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for
the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.").
85. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.13(a) (West 2018) ("Any actions involving punitive damages
shall, if requested by any defendant, be conducted in a bifurcated trial.").
In an action in which the claimant seeks an award of punitive damages, the trier of fact in a bifurcated
proceeding shall first determine whether compensatory damages are to be awarded and in what amount and
by special verdict whether each defendant's conduct was malicious, intentional, fraudulent or reckless and
whether subdivision (a)(7) applies. . . . If a jury finds that the defendant engaged in malicious, intentional,
fraudulent, or reckless conduct, then the court shall promptly commence an evidentiary hearing in which
the jury shall determine the amount of punitive damages, if any.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104(a)(2)-(3) (2018).
86. A. Mitchell Polinsky, Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational? A Com-
ment on Eisenberg et al., 26 J.L. STUD. 663, 672-73 (1997).
87. Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability ofPunitive Damages, 26 J.L. STUD. 623, 632-33 (1997)
[hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Predictability ofPunitive Damages].
88. Id at 646; see also id. ("[T]he model confirms the expected relationships but still leaves us unable to
predict accurately precisely when punitive damages will be awarded.").
89. Id at 650.
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scholars concluded that "[i]n one respect, therefore, punitive damages awards
levels may be . . . predictable."90
Commenting on this research, Polinksy disagreed with the Eisenberg
group's conclusions, explaining that "their results are consistent with the possi-
bility that in each jurisdiction and case category jury decisions to award punitive
damages are random."91 Specifically, he noted that, while the level of compen-
satory damages may help explain the level of punitive damages in a given case,
the "inability to predict when ... punitive damages will be awarded ... negates"
the conclusion that punitive damages are predictable.92 Conducting a separate
analysis, Jonathan Karpoff and John Lott found evidence consistent with Polin-
sky's assessment that punitive damages are not, in general, predictable.93
Expanding on this debate, Eisenberg and other scholars conducted a new
analysis that focused specifically on how punitive damages awards differed de-
pending on whether they were imposed by a judge or jury.94 In general, they
found no statistically significant evidence that juries were more likely to award
punitive damages than judges,95 or that juries impose higher levels of punitive
damages than judges.96 In a subsequent analysis, however, Joni Hersch and W.
Kip Viscusi found consistent empirical evidence that "juries are significantly
more likely to award punitive damages than are judges and award higher levels
of punitive damages."9 7 Eisenberg and colleagues later added that, indeed,
"judges and juries perform similarly in some punitive damages tasks and differ-
ently in others."98
Far from an arcane, academic debate over the merits ofjudges and juries in
the punitive damages context, this debate has played an important role in the
Supreme Court's approach to punitive damages. In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
Justice Souter discussed in detail the empirical evidence generated by the Eisen-
berg group and others on the predictability of punitive damages awards and how
90. Id.
91. Polinsky, supra note 86, at 672.
92. Id. at 672-73.
93. Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, On the Determinants and Importance of Punitive Damages
Awards, 42 J.L. ECON. 527, 543 (1999) ("This result is consistent with Polinsky's prediction: we can explain the
level of punitive damages if we know they will be awarded, but we have a difficult time explaining any of the
overall variation in awards.").
94. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL
L. REv. 743, 743 (2002) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., An Empirical Study].
95. Id. at 762 ("One cannot reject the hypothesis that juries are no more likely thanjudges to award punitive
damages."). But see Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 33, at 916 (finding experimental evidence that suggests juries
are more likely to award punitive damages than judges).
96. Eisenberg et al., An Empirical Study, supra note 94, at 773-74 ("None of the models support he hy-
pothesis that judges and juries differ in the way they set levels of punitive awards or in the amount of punitive
damages awarded per unit of compensatory damages.").
97. Hersch & Viscusi, Punitive Damages, upra note 3, at 1.
98. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil
Justice Survey ofState Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL L. STuD. 263, 263-64 (2006) [here-
inafter Eisenberg et al., Empirical Analyses].
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this differed across judges and juries.99 The Court then explicitly relied on these,
and other empirical results, in holding that the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages could not exceed 1:1 in maritime cases.100 Though the Court was clear
that its responsibilities in deciding the appropriate ratio of punitive to compen-
satory damages under federal maritime law were different from its responsibili-
ties in determining the outer contours of permissibility under the Due Process
Clause,'o the Court's heavy (in fact, nearly exclusive) reliance on empirical re-
sults in Exxon Shipping illustrates the importance of empirical evidence in deter-
mining the appropriate restrictions on punitive damages.
While the Court was analyzing empirical results in Exxon Shipping, schol-
ars were busy analyzing the effect of the Court's decisions on their results.102
Unsurprisingly, the Court's decision in State Farm has been thoroughly exam-
ined in multiple studies, given its prominence in placing the clearest constitu-
tional limitation to date on punitive damages.1 03 Returning to the Court's primary
concern regarding the relationship between compensatory and punitive dam-
ages-i.e., the ratio that has dominated the Supreme Court's cases over the past
fifteen years-separate studies by McMichael along with Eisenberg and Heise
concluded that this decision did little to reduce punitive damages awards as one
might expect.'" Instead, the evidence based on a national sample of state court
cases suggested that State Farm either had no effect on punitive damages awards
or actually increased those awards.0 5
Examining the same dataset of punitive damages awards, McMichael and
Viscusi applied a specific mathematical model of how adjudicators impose pu-
nitive damages, accounting separately for the decision to impose any damages
99. 554 U.S. 471, 499 (2008) ("A recent comprehensive study of punitive damages awarded by juries in
state civil trials found a median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards ofjust 0.62:1, but a mean ratio of 2.90:1
and a standard deviation of 13.81." (citing Eisenberg et al., Empirical Analyses, supra note 98, at 269)).
100. Id.at513.
On these assumptions, a median ratio of punitive to compensatory damages of about 0.65:1 probably marks
the line near which cases like this one largely should be grouped. Accordingly, given the need to protect
against the possibility (and the disruptive cost to the legal system) of awards that are unpredictable and
unnecessary, either for deterrence or for measured retribution, we consider that a 1:1 ratio, which is above
the median award, is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases.
Id. (citing Eisenberg et al., Empirical Analyses, supra note 98, at 269).
101. Id. 501-02.
Today's enquiry differs from due process review because the case arises under federal maritime jurisdiction,
and we are reviewing ajury award for conformity with maritime law, rather than the outer limit allowed by
due process; we are examining the verdict in the exercise of federal maritime common law authority, which
precedes and should obviate any application of the constitutional standard. Our due process cases, on the
contrary, have all involved awards subject in the first instance to state law.
Id.
102. See, e.g., Viscusi & McMichael, Shifling the Fat-Tailed Distribution, supra note 3, at 363-64 (exam-
ining the role of Exxon Shipping in an empirical analysis).
103. While Exxon Shipping has not been ignored, it has played a smaller role in empirical analyses because
it was limited to federal maritime cases. See, e.g., id. at 363-64 (examining the role of Exxon Shipping in an
empirical analysis); Del Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 3 (examining the same).
104. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 14, at 346-51; Benjamin J. McMichael, Note, Constitutional Limita-
tions on Punitive Damages: Ambiguous Effects and Inconsistent Justifications, 66 VAND. L. REv. 961, 993-96
(2013).
105. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 14, at 346-51; McMichael, supra note 104, at 993-96.
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and the decision of what amount to impose.10 6 Within this model, they found,
consistent with prior work, little evidence that State Farm limited the size of
punitive damages awards.0 7 Unlike previous work, however, they extended their
analysis to explicitly examine the role of state punitive damages reforms along-
side State Farm, finding that caps on punitive damages do not affect whether
adjudicators impose these awards but do reduce the amount of damages they im-
pose.'08 Further, their results suggested that increasing the conduct standard re-
quired to support a punitive damages award above negligence decreased both the
probability that punitive damages were awarded and the size of those awards.
Other state-level reforms, however, such as increasing the evidentiary burden
required to support a punitive award and allowing or requiring bifurcated trials,
affected neither the likelihood of an award, nor the size of awards.109
While the effect of state-level punitive-damages reforms has received at-
tention in the literature beyond the analysis conducted by McMichael and Vis-
cusi, the majority of the existing research has focused on the role of these reforms
on outcomes other than actual punitive damages awards.'10 And while these anal-
yses can elucidate the roles of changes in both state and federal law on punitive
damages generally-all of these studies consider a national sample of punitive
awards or other sample of "typical" awards-they do not focus specifically on
the types of awards that have generated the most interest among both defendants
and the Supreme Court, i.e., the very largest "outlier" awards."' These awards
are discussed in the next Part.
III. THE BLOCKBUSTER AWARDS
Though the Supreme Court has never specifically defined what it means by
"outlier" awards, "blockbuster" awards are likely what the Court has in mind.1 12
These are awards of over $100 million at the time they are imposed and represent
a significant punishment for any defendants finding themselves liable for these
106. McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 85-89.
107. Id. at 93.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, An Empirical Study ofthe Impact ofTort Reforms on Medical Malpractice
Settlement Payments, 34 J.L. STuD. S183 (2007) (considering the role of punitive damages caps in medical mal-
practice payments); Ronen Avraham & Max Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform on Private Health Insur-
ance Coverage, 12 AM. L. ECON. REv. 319 (2010) (analyzing the effect of punitive damages caps on the likeli-
hood that individuals have health insurance); Paul Rubin & Joanna Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental
Deaths, 50 J.L. ECON. 221 (2007) (examining the effect of increased evidentiary standards for punitive damages
on accident rates).
111. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501 (2008) ("The Court's response to outlier
punitive-damages awards has thus far been confined by claims at the constitutional evel, and our cases have
announced due process standards that every award must pass."); id. at 504 ("This is why our better judgment is
that eliminating unpredictable outlying punitive awards by more rigorous standards than the constitutional imit
will probably have to take the form adopted in those States that have looked to the criminal-law pattern of quan-
tified limits.").
112. The Court has also referred to outlier awards in terms of a very high ratio between punitive and com-
pensatory damages. See id. at 501.
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awards.13 Though such large awards are not common-only 137 were imposed
between 1981 and 2013114-they have the potential to catch the attention of even
large corporate defendants and are often imposed as a strong condemnation of a
defendant's behavior. For example, the first blockbuster award was imposed in
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. based on Ford's design of the Pinto and that vehi-
cle's proclivity to catch fire following rear-end collisions."5 Even decades after
the award was handed down by a California jury, the case is interpreted as a
warning to the automobile industry that consumers would not tolerate manufac-
turers ignoring defects and that, if they did, they would be punished accord-
ingly." 6
113. See Viscusi & McMichael, Shifting the Fat-Tailed Distribution, supra note 3, at 350 (referring to
scholars considering awards of more than $100 million "blockbuster" awards).
114. Seeidat357.
115. 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 771-79 (1981).
116. Carol J. Williams, Toyota Is Just the Latest Automaker to Face Auto Safety Litigation, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 14, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/14/business/la-fi-toyota-litigatel4-2010narl4 (noting that
the award "signaled to the auto industry that it would be harshly sanctioned for ignoring known defects").
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Year
Notes: The jagged, horizontal line represents the total number of blockbuster awards handed
down each year, and the vertical line indicates when State Farm was decided.
Following Grimshaw, blockbuster awards became increasingly common in
the ensuing decades, and by the early 1990s, five or more blockbuster awards per
year was the norm. Figure 1 provides an overview of the number of blockbuster
cases each year. Picking up steam in the 1990s, the total number of blockbuster
cases peaked in 1999 with fifteen awards. Thereafter, the number per year de-
creased, and following the Supreme Court's decision in State Farm-delineated
in Figure 1 with the vertical line at the 2003 mark-no more than eight block-
buster awards have been handed down in any single year. While blockbuster pu-
nitive damages awards have been mainstays of the legal world since the 1990s,
not all states can lay claim to having such an award. Indeed, a few states have
dominated the blockbuster landscape, and Figure 2 provides a heat map of states
where blockbuster awards have been imposed, with darker states having had
more such awards. Unsurprisingly, populous states like Texas and California
have had the most blockbuster awards. Interestingly, however, smaller states
such as West Virginia, Alabama, and Oregon have had several awards within
their borders.
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uter cases are included. Darker states have ha
fable 1 provides an exhaustive listing of all of the blockbuster cases we
have identified between 1981 and 2013, which is the time period that will be
used for the subsequent empirical analysis. Included with each case is the amount
of compensatory damages ("CD"') and punitive damages ("PD") awarded (in mil-
lions of dollars) and the ratio between the two. Many awards barely satisfy the
blockbuster criterion of $100 million, which may be a focal damage amount for
jurors, but a number of awards exceed this threshold by more than an order of
magnitude. The ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, which has recei'ved
most of the C'ourt's attention, varies widely from well under I to over 10,000 in
the most extreme cases. Collectively, F igures 1 and 2 along with T1able 1 paint
an interesting picture of the blockbuster landscape, and these awards have been
the subject of some debate, particularly given that they are among the most ex-
treme outlying cases that have cauight the eye of the Supreme Court.
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TABLE 1: BLOCKBUSTER CASES
Case Name State Year Punitive Compensatory Ratio
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co. CA 1981 125 3 40.64
Micro/Vest v. Computer-
Land CA 1985 125 400 0.31
Pennzoil v. Texaco TX 1985 3,000 7,530 0.40
In re Tech. Equities Fed.
Sec. Litig. CA 1988 147 7 21.00
Md. Deposit Ins. Fund v.
Seidel MD 1988 322 65 4.95
Coyne v. Celotex MD 1989 150 2 75.00
Proctor v. Davis and Upjohn
Co. IIL 1991 125 3 39.55
Dominguez Energy v. Shell
Oil CA 1993 173 47 3.69
Amoco v. Lloyd's of Lon-
don CA 1993 386 36 10.73
Moseley v. Gen. Motors GA 1993 101 4 23.82
Hedrick v. Sentry Ins. Co. TX 1993 100 2 46.08
Rubicon Petroleum Inc. v.
Amoco TX 1993 250 125 2.00
Howell v. Blockbuster
Entm't Corp. TX 1994 109 15 7.41
In re The Exxon Valdez AK 1995 5,000 287 17.42
Perez v. William Recht Co. FL 1995 300 200 1.50
Smith v. Delta TV MS 1995 167 1 334.44
O'Keefe v. Loewen Grp. MS 1995 400 100 4.00
Hardy v. Gen. Motors Corp. AL 1996 100 50 2.00
Forti v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp. CA 1996 100 7 13.51
Houchens v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp. KY 1996 210 8 27.27
Barnett v. La Societe
Anonyme Turbomeca
France MZ 1996 175 175 1.00
Broussard v. Meineke Disc.
Muffler Shops NC 1996 150 197 0.76
Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v.
KCS Res. TX 1996 114 29 3.93
Bartlett v. Mitchell Energy
Corp. TX 1996 200 4 49.38
Campbell v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. UT 1996 145 3 55.77
In re New Orleans Tank Car
Leakage Fire Litig. LA 1997 3,365 2 1682.50
Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp. SC 1997 250 13 20.00
50-Off Stores Inc. v. Banque
Paribas (Suisse) TX 1997 138 13 10.70
MMAR. v. Dow Jones TX 1997 200 23 8.81
Lockheed Litigation Cases CA 1998 760 25 29.92
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Six Flags Over Ga. v.
Time Warner GA 1998 257 197 1.30
Robinson v. Ford Motor Co. MS 1998 120 25 4.82
Aaron v. Abex Corp. TX 1998 100 16 6.41
Carlisle v. Whirlpool Fin.
Nat'l Bank AL 1999 580 1 591.84
Aultman v. Duncan Mfg. AL 1999 100 15 6.90
Robert J. Bellott Ins.
Agency Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. AK 1999 150 3 55.56
Romo v. Ford Motor Co. CA 1999 290 5 54.72
Anderson v. Gen. Motors CA 1999 4,775 108 44.38
Goodrich v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare of Cal. CA 1999 116 5 25.78
Trovan Ltd. v. Pfizer Inc. CA 1999 135 8 16.88
Martin v. ServiceMaster Co. GA 1999 135 1 107.14
Avery v. State Farm IL 1999 600 130 4.62
Alcorn v. Nat'l R.R. Passen-
ger Corp. MO 1999 120 40 2.97
White v. Ford Motor Co. NV 1999 153 2 66.60
Swan v. Einhorn PA 1999 752 155 4.85
Rhodes v. Sensitive Care TX 1999 250 <1 1250.00
City of West Allis v. Wis.
Elec. WI 1999 100 5 22.22
Cowart v. Johnson Kart
Mfg. WI 1999 1,000 24 41.67
Carroll v. Interstate Brands CA 2000 121 11 11.00
Engle v. R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco FL 2000 145,000 13 11417.32
Dorman v. Bridgestone/Fire-
stone Inc. MO 2000 100 5 20.00
Pioneer Commercial Fund-
ing v. Am. Fin. Mortg. PA 2000 338 15 23.28
Timely Adventures v.
Coastal Mart Inc. TX 2000 100 2 47.62
Martin v. Children's Ad-
vanced Med. Insts. TX 2000 137 132 1.04
Boeken v. Philip Morris CA 2001 3,000 6 541.52
Elahi v. Islamic Republic of
Iran DC 2001 300 12 25.00
Cassoutt v. Cessna Aircraft FL 2001 400 80 5.00
Grefer v. Alpha Tech.
Servs. LA 2001 1,000 56 17.82
COC Servs. Ltd. v. Corn-
pUSA TX 2001 365 90 4.05
Fuqua v. Horizon/CMS
Healthcare Corp. TX 2001 310 3 114.39
Bell v. Dresser Indus. TX 2001 100 30 3.33
Jernigan v. Gen. Motors AL 2002 100 22 4.55
Bullock v. Philip Morris CA 2002 28,000 1 43076.92
Claghorn v. Edsaco CA 2002 165 6 28.95
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City of Hope v. Genentech CA 2002 200 300 0.67
Steele Software Corp. v.
First Union Nat'l Bank MD 2002 200 76 2.63
IGEN Int'l Inc. v.
Roche Diagnostics GmbH MD 2002 400 105 3.81
Hayes v. Courtney Phar-
macy, Inc. MO 2002 2,000 225 8.89
Schwarz v. Philip Morris OR 2002 150 <1 882.35
Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Ala. Dep't of Conservation
& Nat. Res. AL 2003 11,800 64 185.53
Beckman Coulter Inc. v.
Flextronics CA 2003 931 3 321.03
Price v. Philip Morris, Inc. IL 2003 3,100 7,100 0.44
Whittington v. U.S. Steel IL 2003 200 50 4.00
Motorola Credit Corp. v.
Uzan NY 2003 2,130 2,130 1.00
TVT Records v. Island Def
Jam Music Grp. NY 2003 107 25 4.28
Bums v. Prudential Sec. OH 2003 250 12 20.33
Anadarko Petroleum Corp.
v. T-Bar X Ltd. Co. TX 2003 100 40 2.50
Whittaker v. Sw. Life Ins.
Co. AL 2004 1,600 20 80.00
Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor
Co. CA 2004 246 123 2.00
Brown v. Dorsey GA 2004 450 326 1.38
Medtronic Sofamor Danek
Inc. v. Michelson TN 2004 400 160 2.50
Poliner v. Tex. Health Sys. TX 2004 110 256 0.43
Coffey v. Wyeth TX 2004 900 113 7.94
Garamendi v. Altus Fin.,
S.A. CA 2005 700 0 N/A
Savaglio v. Wal-Mart Stores CA 2005 115 57 2.02
Coleman Parent Holdings v.
Morgan Stanley FL 2005 850 604 1.41
Ernst v. Merck TX 2005 229 25 9.35
Featherston v. Gressler TX 2005 600 6 100.00
City of Modesto v. Dow CA 2006 175 3 54.69
de Villers v. Rossum CA 2006 100 6 16.67
Cook v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp. CO 2006 200 354 0.57
Navarro v. Austin FL 2006 100 117 0.86
Man Aktiengesellschaft v.
Freightliner LLC OR 2006 350 966 0.36
Gulsby Eng'g v. Gulf
Liquids New River Project TX 2006 325 375 0.87
Casas v. Paradez TX 2006 150 10 15.00
Cal X-tra v. Phoenix Hold-
ings II LLC AZ 2007 150 210 0.71
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Banco Espirito Santo Inter-
national Ltd. v. BDO Seid-
man LLP FL 2007 352 170 2.07
Martin v. Swain FL 2007 100 10 10.00
Wheeling Pittsburgh v. Mas-
sey Energy Co. WV 2007 100 120 0.83
Perrine v. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours and Co. WV 2007 196 56 3.54
Estate of Tawney v. Colum.
Nat. Res. WV 2007 270 134 2.01
State of Alabama v.
AstraZeneca LP AL 2008 175 40 4.38
ICO Global Communica-
tions v. Boeing Satellite Sys.
Int'l Inc. CA 2008 236 371 0.64
Estate of LoCascio v.
LoCascio FL 2008 100 25 3.98
Estate of del Pino v. The Re-
public of Cuba FL 2008 250 3 100.00
Hyatt v. Franchise Tax Bd.
of the State of Cal. NV 2008 250 138 1.81
Estate of Mack v. Mack NV 2008 405 185 2.19
Adidas Am. Inc. v. Payless
Shoesource, Inc. OR 2008 137 168 0.82
Stone v. Marcone FL 2009 275 55 5.00
Naugle v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc. FL 2009 244 56 4.36
Ind. Recovery Capital Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Simmons TX 2009 145 34 4.30
Newman v. Nat'l W. Life
Ins. Co. TX 2009 150 <1 1330.54
Garner v. BP Prods. N. Am. TX 2009 100 <1 306.51
Evans v. A.W. Chesterton
Co. CA 2010 200 9 22.67
Jackson v. Briar Hill FL 2010 100 14 7.14
Chanin v. Teva Parenteral
Meds. NV 2010 144 361 0.40
Velez v. Novartis Corp. NY 2010 250 3 74.24
Dillard's Inc. v. i2 Tech.,
Inc. TX 2010 150 76 1.97
Middleton v. Collins TX 2011 150,000 370 405.41
Pacesetter, Inc. v. Nervicon
Co. CA 2011 500 1,816 0.28
Allison v. ExxonMobil
Corp. MD 2011 1,045 497 2.10
Heilig v. Fluor Corp. MO 2011 320 39 8.31
Brown v. Chevron Phillips
Chemical Co. MS 2011 300 22 13.64
Ray v. Allergan, Inc. VA 2011 200 12 16.67
Sacks v. Sicor Inc. NV 2011 163 20 8.08
Meins v. Bayer AG AR 2011 125 17 7.40
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Webb v. Trans Healthcare,
Inc. FL 2012 700 200 3.50
Garcia v. Apollo Beach
Food Mart, Inc. FL 2012 550 167 3.30
Nunziata v. Pinellas Park
Nursing Home FL 2012 140 60 2.33
Chopourian v. Catholic
Healthcare W. CA 2012 140 0 N/A
Juno v. Amare AL 2012 125 43 2.93
Mansfield v. Homer MO 2012 100 9 11.49
Townsend v.
Trans Healthcare, Inc. FL 2013 1,000 110 9.09
Lennar Corp. v.
Briarwood Capital FL 2013 200 802 0.25
Meyer v. Health Plan of
Nev., Inc. NV 2013 500 24 20.83
Aguilar v. Heckmann
Water Res., Inc. TX 2013 100 182 0.55
Carduco Inc. v. Mercedes
Benz USA TX 2013 115 27 4.19
After blockbuster awards were first classified as a subset of punitive dam-
ages awards in 2004,117 Alison Del Rossi and W. Kip Viscusi performed a rigor-
ous empirical analysis of these extreme awards, focusing specifically on how the
pattern of blockbuster awards changed following landmark decisions. They
found consistent evidence that State Farm reduced the size of blockbuster
awards, the number of blockbuster awards, and the ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages."1 8 In a subsequent analysis, Viscusi and McMichael
compared blockbuster punitive damages awards to other statistical outliers that
are observed for natural disasters, such as hurricanes and earthquakes, because
both blockbuster awards and natural disasters have what statisticians call "fat
tailed distributions."'119 In particular, the extremely high loss disasters are at a
level that would not be predicted if losses were normally distributed. The fact
that the distribution of blockbuster awards has a fat tail means that they "occur
more often and are more difficult to predict than if blockbuster awards were dis-
tributed normally." 20 Viscusi and McMichael found consistent evidence, how-
ever, that State Farm rendered blockbuster awards more predictable by decreas-
ing the amount of punitive damages awarded in blockbuster cases, reducing the
likelihood that cases included punitive awards in excess of the "single-digit ra-
tio" discussed by the Supreme Court, and "effectively 'thin[ning]' the fat tail of
the distribution of blockbuster awards."l 21
While the blockbuster awards have been subject to empirical analyses, one
key aspect of these awards has gone unexamined-the role of state-level punitive
117. See Hersch & Viscusi, Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 2; Viscusi, supra note 3, at 1405.
118. Del Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 3, at 137-52.
119. Viscusi & McMichael, Shifting the Fat-Tailed Distribution, supra note 3, at 350.
120. Id.
121. Id at 360-70, 376.
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damages reforms. To be sure, understanding the effect of State Farm on these
outlier awards is important; however, the Supreme Court has been clear that it is
willing to look to state-level reforms, such as caps on punitive damages, when
determining the appropriate restrictions on punitive damages.
122 Thus, under-
standing the effect of these state reforms on blockbuster awards can elucidate
new ways in which the Court may address future challenges to extremely large
punitive damages awards. Accordingly, the next Part offers the first empirical
analysis that specifically examines state-level reforms and compares them to ex-
isting restrictions under federal law.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
When awarding punitive damages, adjudicators face two separate-though
related-decisions. First, they must decide, based on the reprehensibility of the
defendants' conduct, whether these damages are warranted in a given case.123
Second, they must decide what amount of punitive damages are appropriate to
deter and punish the defendant.12 4 In the context of blockbuster awards, these
two decisions translate neatly into two separate empirical analyses, and we pre-
sent both in this Part. We begin by examining the frequency of blockbuster
awards and whether the number of awards per year has been affected by State
Farm, state level reforms, both, or neither. While we cannot directly examine the
probability that a particular case involves a blockbuster punitive damages
award,125 examining the frequency of awards can elucidate whether State Farm
and state-level reforms effectively reduce this probability. In the second phase of
our analysis, we focus on the amount of damages awarded in blockbuster cases.
Before delving into the details of our analytical approach, however, we first pro-
vide an overview of the data on blockbuster awards we examine.
A. Data
Much of the data used in our analysis is reported in Table 1, which includes
the year and state of each blockbuster award we have identified as well as the
amount of compensatory damages and punitive damages.1
26 In addition to these
details, we collected information on the industry of the defendant and categorized
defendants into the following industry groups: automobile, tobacco, finance and
insurance, petroleum and chemical, and health care. Not all defendants fit into
122. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471,495-96 (2008).
123. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,409 (2003).
124. Polinsky, supra note 86, at 672.
125. To do so, we would have to either observe every single civil case that is eligible for punitive damages
across the United States-obviously beyond our capabilities-or a subset of cases that have the potential to in-
volve a blockbuster award. Even if we could observe all of the cases necessary to develop this subset, any attempt
to systematically identify these cases would almost certainly introduce bias into our analysis. Accordingly, we
restrict our analysis to the frequency of blockbuster awards because a decrease (increase) in the frequency of
these awards necessarily implies a decrease (increase) in the probability that they are imposed.
126. While Table 1 reports the actual amount of damages awarded in a given case, for the purposes of our
empirical analysis, all damages amounts are inflated to 2013 dollars.
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these categories, and we classify defendants who participate in all other indus-
tries into a separate category. For each of these industry categories, we create an
indicator variable that equals one if a particular case involved a defendant from
that industry. Individual industries may have different norms, different types of
damages, and different potentials to facilitate reprehensible behavior, so we in-
clude these industry indicator variables in our analysis to control for these dif-
ferences.
Not all blockbuster cases involve corporate defendants, so we also created
a separate indicator variable that equals one if a given case involves both indi-
vidual and corporate litigants. Adjudicators may have different attitudes with re-
spect to imposing extremely large punitive damages awards on corporations as
opposed to individuals and including an indicator variable for the types of liti-
gants involved addresses the concern that these different attitudes may bias our
results. Among cases not involving corporate litigants, some involve violent
crimes, and we created an indicator variable for these cases.127 Violent crimes
may be particularly well suited to blockbuster punitive damages awards because
they almost certainly involve particularly reprehensible conduct. Because adju-
dicators may react differently to these types of cases relative to other types, we
created a separate variable for whether a violent crime was the basis of a block-
buster award.
Next, we collected information on whether a judge or jury handed down
each blockbuster award. As discussed above, a significant amount of scholarly
attention has been focused on the differences between judges and juries with re-
spect to punitive damages awards.128 Therefore, we use an indicator variable for
whether a judge imposed a given award throughout our analysis. Including this
variable ensures that our results are not biased because judges and juries ap-
proach punitive damages differently. Finally, while creating a variable for
whether a given case is subject to the limitations outlined in State Farm is
straightforward,129 creating indicator variables for state-level reforms is less so.
As discussed above, punitive damages caps take various forms, and no two states
have enacted exactly the same cap.'30 Including separate indicator variables for
each cap is not statistically feasible,1 31 so we rely on the Database of State Tort
Law Reforms ("DSTLR") compiled by Ronen Avraham.13 2 The DSTLR pro-
vides the year of enactment and statutory text for individual punitive damages
caps, and we use this information to construct an indicator variable that equals
127. This indicator is created based on the nature of the conduct alleged and does not depend on whether
the civil defendant was indicted, prosecuted, or convicted.
128. See discussion supra Section I.C.
129. Specifically, we created an indicator variable that equals one ifan award was imposed after State Farm
was decided.
130. See discussion supra Subsection II.B.2.
131. Such an approach is not possible without substantial quantities of data-more than are available to
researchers. Additionally, including a separate variable for each state's cap would simply devolve into a qualita-
tive analysis of individual state laws. While such an analysis could be useful, that is not our goal here.
132. See generally Avraham, supra note 75.
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one when a given state had a cap in place.1 33 We also glean from the DSTLR
which states had enacted evidentiary reform with respect to punitive damages for
use in supplemental analyses.
Using all of these data, we conduct a thorough empirical analysis of the
effects of both State Farm and state-level reforms on blockbuster awards. The
next Section describes that analysis in detail.
B. Analysis and Results
1. Award Frequency
Beginning with the frequency with which blockbuster awards are imposed,
we estimate a series of empirical models to examine the impact of State Farm
and state-level reforms, particularly punitive damages caps. Specifically, we es-
timate four ordinary least squares ("OLS") regression models, and throughout
this phase of our analysis, the dependent variable is a count of the number of
blockbuster cases that were decided in each state in each year. The independent
variables of interest in these regressions are indicators for whether a state had
enacted a punitive damages cap and an indicator for whether State Farm had
been decided. In theory, the effect of both of these variables should be negative,
implying that punitive damages caps and State Farm both reduced the frequency
of blockbuster awards.134 More interesting than the individual effects of these
legal changes, however, are their comparative effects.
Ex ante, there are good reasons to believe that State Farm may have a
stronger effect than punitive damages caps. As Supreme Court precedent, it ap-
plies more broadly than punitive damages caps, and relative to caps, the single-
digit-ratio limitation contains fewer exceptions.'35 There are also good reasons
to believe, however, that caps may have a stronger dampening effect on the fre-
quency of blockbuster punitive damages awards than State Farm. Caps generally
place stricter limits on punitive damages awards."' Because one might hypoth-
esize that either State Farm or punitive damages caps may have a stronger effect
on the number of blockbuster awards, comparing the magnitude of their effects
within our empirical analysis can elucidate which legal change has been more
salient.
133. The DSTLR further providers a "clever" definition of punitive damages caps. "Clever" caps include
only those that are set low enough and contain sufficiently few exceptions to effectively bind courts when im-
posing punitive damages awards. Throughout our analysis, we use the DSTLR's definition of a clever cap. See
id.
134. See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); see also McMichael
& Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 91.
135. The Court has never outlined what these exceptions may be but has implied that, in at least some cases,
violating the single-digit ratio is constitutionally permissible. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (holding that "few"
awards in excess of a single-digit ratio will satisfy due process without specifying what factors may allow an
award to exceed this ratio while still satisfying due process).
136. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102 (2018) (allowing a ratio not to exceed 1:1, except for a limited
set of circumstances in which 3:1 in permissible).
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In addition to the independent variables of interest, we include a linear time
trend to account for the general growth in the number of blockbuster awards over
time. Our analysis also includes indicator variables for each state, which control
for any idiosyncratic factors unique to specific states that may affect the fre-
quency of blockbuster awards. Throughout our analysis, we calculate heterosce-
dasticity-robust standard errors.
In the interest of succinctness, the implications of our primary regression
results are reported in Figure 3.137 We estimate four separate regression models,
and each bar or set of bars in Figure 3 represents the primary results from a single
model. All four models include all of the control variables discussed above but
successively add different variables for the effect of State Farm and punitive
damages caps.138 Model 1, which focuses only on the effect of State Farm, pro-
vides strong evidence that State Farm has a limiting effect on the number of
blockbuster awards. State Farm reduced the number of blockbuster awards by
about 0.1. Model 2, which focuses on the effect of punitive damages caps, pro-
vides strong evidence that, like State Farm, caps reduce the number of block-
buster awards. The effect of caps, however, is smaller than the effect of State
Farm, suggesting that the latter may be slightly more effective at reducing the
incidence of blockbuster awards.
137. Complete regression results are provided in the Technical Appendix.
138. Estimating multiple models and successively adding the variables of interest ensures that these varia-
bles have a consistent effect across models and acts as a robustness check on the results.
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Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
State Farm EZZ PD Cap
Notes: N = 957. Each bar or set of bars in Figure 3 represents the primary results from a single model, and the model
numbers correspond to the models reported in Table Al in the Technical Appendix.
Model 3 and Model 4 include both the State Farm and cap variables so that
both effects are taken into account.139 Model 4 also includes indicator variables
for other pertinent ort reforms; in particular, punitive damages, evidentiary re-
form, and trial bifurcation. Across both Model 3 and Model 4, the effects of State
Farm and punitive damages caps remain stable and statistically significant. In
Model 3, State Farm has a -0.1460 effect on the number of blockbuster cases,
compared to -0.0997 for state caps. Though not reported in Figure 3, allowing or
requiring bifurcated trials does not have a statistically significant effect on the
number of blockbuster awards. 14 Maintaining a lower evidentiary standard (i.e.,
not increasing this standard to a "clear and convincing" or "reasonable doubt"
standard), however, increases the number of blockbuster awards by about the
same amount as State Farm reduces this number.
Overall, we find consistent evidence that both State Farm and punitive
damages caps reduce the number of blockbuster awards. In all of our models,
however, State Farm has a somewhat greater effect on the number of cases than
do punitive caps. We explore the implications of State Farm having a larger ef-
fect than caps below. But before doing so, we first discuss the effect of State
139. Including both variables in the same regression ensures that one variable is not simply picking up the
effect of the other.
140. See McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 93-94.
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Farm and caps on the amount of damages awarded because this further elucidates
the comparative effects of these two legal changes.
2. Award Amounts
In examining the amount of damages awarded as part of blockbuster cases,
we estimate a series of OLS regression models to determine the impact of state-
level reforms and State Farm on the magnitude of these awards. In all of these
models, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the amount of punitive
damages awarded.14 1 Importantly, all of the models examining the amount of
punitive damages awarded include, as an independent variable, the natural loga-
rithm of compensatory damages.14 2 We include this variable in all of our models
because prior work has consistently demonstrated a strong association between
the amount of compensatory damages awarded and the amount of punitive dam-
ages.143 Further, the Supreme Court has stated its strong interest in the relation-
ship between compensatory and punitive damages,1" and including a compen-
satory damages variable allows us to examine this relationship in detail.
As with the models focusing on the number of blockbuster cases, we se-
quentially add the State Farm and punitive damages cap variables to examine
their effect on the amount of punitive damages awarded. In addition to including
these variables alone, we also estimate models which include an interaction be-
tween these variables and the natural logarithm of compensatory damages. The
models which include only the indicator variables allow us to examine the gen-
eral effect of State Farm and punitive damages caps, and the models which in-
clude the interaction of these variables and compensatory damages allow us to
examine how State Farm and punitive damages caps mediate the relationship
between compensatory and punitive damages.
As discussed above, all of our models include a series of control variables,
which allow us to isolate the effect of the variables of interest from other factors
that may impact the amount of punitive damages awarded. In particular, we in-
clude a series of indicator variables for the different industries mentioned above
and an indicator variable for whether the case involved a violent crime. We also
include indicator variables for whether a case was decided in Texas or California,
since these states impose more blockbuster cases than any other.145 All of our
models include a linear time trend to capture the general increase in award
141. The amount of punitive damages awarded exhibits a substantial right skew. To address this, we follow
the standard practice in the punitive damages literature by transforming the amount of damages awarded using a
natural logarithm. Eisenberg et al., Predictability ofPunitive Damages, supra note 87, at 264; Viscusi & McMi-
chael, Shifting the Fat-Tailed Distribution, supra note 3, at 360.
142. We use the natural logarithm of this variable for the same reasons we examine the natural logarithm
of punitive damages.
143. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 14, at 344; Hersch & Viscusi, Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 15.
144. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996).
145. See supra Figure 2.
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amounts over time. Each model also includes a bench trial indicator variable, and
an indicator for whether both business and individual litigants were involved.14 6
Figures 4 and 5 summarize the relationship between compensatory and pu-
nitive damages and the effect of State Farm and punitive damages caps on this
relationship. In both figures, a larger compensatory damages award is clearly
associated with a larger punitive damages award, as the line capturing the rela-
tionship between the types of damages has a clear upward slope.
FIGURE 4: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
BEFORE AND AFTER STATE FARM
C3
000 .
10 15 20 25
log(compensatory damages)
Pre-State Farm ---- Post-State Farm
Notes: N= 133. The pre-State Farm line represents the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages prior
to the State Farm decision and is plotted using only pre-State Farm cases. Similarly, the post-State Farm line represents
the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages after the State Farm decision and is plotted using only
post-State Farm cases. Additional results may be found in Table A2 in the Technical Appendix.
In Figure 4, State Farm has a clear impact on the relationship between com-
pensatory and punitive damages, as it tilts this relationship downward for large
compensatory damages amounts.14 7 At low levels of compensatory damages,
awards before and after State Farm had roughly the same relationship between
146. As discussed in more detail in the Technical Appendix, we do not separately report the results from
models that include variables for punitive damages, evidentiary reform, or bifurcated trials. These variables are
never individually statistically significant, and including them in the models does not meaningfully affect the
State Farm or punitive damages cap variables.
147. The two lines plotted in Figure 4 are based on two separate regressions (each of which includes a full
set of control variables). The "Pre-State Farm" regression model includes only those awards imposed prior to
State Farm, and the "Post-State Farm" regression model includes only those awards imposed after State Farm
was decided.
204 [Vol. 2019
No. 1] TAMING BLOCKBUSTER PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
compensatory and punitive damages; at higher levels of compensatory damages,
however, cases subject to the limitations of State Farm have a lower ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages. In other words, at lower levels of compensa-
tory damages, an additional dollar of compensatory damages was worth about
the same in terms of increased punitive damages before and after State Farm. At
higher levels of compensatory damages, however, an additional dollar of these
damages was worth much more in terms of punitive damages before State Farm
was decided. Thus, State Farm changed the relationship between compensatory
and punitive damages in blockbuster cases just as the Supreme Court intended.
Figure 5, which presents the effect of punitive damages caps, tells a much
different story. 148 Indeed, the relationship between compensatory and punitive
damages in states with a cap is virtually indistinguishable from the relationship
in states without a cap. Thus, we find no evidence that punitive damages caps
have had a restraining effect on the relationship between compensatory and pu-
nitive damages.
148. The two lines plotted in Figure 5 are based on two separate regressions (each of which includes a full
set of control variables). The "No PD Cap" regression model includes only those awards imposed in states with-
out a punitive damages cap, and the "PD Cap" regression model includes only those awards imposed in states
with a cap.
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FIGURE 5: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
IN STATES WITH AN) WITHOUT PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAPS
10 15 20 25
log compensatory damages)
I- NoPDCap ---- Da
Notes: N - 133. The No PD Cap line represents the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages prior in
states without a punitive damages cap and is plotted using only blockbuster cases decided in states without a cap. Simni-
larly, the PD Cap line represents the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages prior in states with a
punitive damages cap and is plotted using only blockbuster cases decided in states with a cap. Additional results may be
found in Table A2 in the Technical Appendix.
The relative effects of State Farm and punitive damages caps on the amount
of punitive damages awarded in blockbuster cases are different from their rela-
tive effects on the frequency with which these awards are handed down. Where
both State Farm and caps reduced the frequency of blockbuster awards, only
State Farm reduces the amount of punitive damages awarded, with caps having
no statistically significant effect. The implications of this difference in effects is
discussed in the next Part.
V. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A NEW (EMPIRICAL) CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
Though the Supreme Court has not revisited punitive damages under the
Due Process Clause in the last few years, its case law in this area nonetheless
remains unsettled.149 In State Farm itself, the Court reversed course from dec-
ades of cases in offering something approaching a bright-line, mathematical rule
for punitive damages despite having stated on multiple previous occasions its
149. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) ("We decline again to
impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed.").
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desire to avoid doing so.5 0 In Exxon Shipping, the Court, while technically ana-
lyzing punitive damages under federal maritime law, noted serious reservations
about how punitive damages are imposed.51 And these reservations were based,
in large part, on the existing empirical evidence.152 The empirical evidence we
develop in this Article is relevant to the ongoing debate over the most appropriate
way to address punitive damages, and this evidence is particularly helpful in the
context of other empirical evidence on punitive damages. Therefore, we first
place the evidence developed here in the broader context of the existing literature
before making specific recommendations on the best ways to address punitive
damages awards in the future.
A. The Evidence in Context: Blockbuster and More Typical Awards
Decomposing punitive damages awards into (1) the decision to award pu-
nitive damages (or the frequency with which they are awarded) and (2) the deci-
sion of what amount of damages to impose, the evidence presented above demon-
strates that State Farm affects both of these decisions and punitive damages caps
affect only the first decision. While these results pertain only to blockbuster
awards, McMichael and Viscusi perform a similar analysis using a national sam-
ple of punitive damages awards.15 3 Developing a specific mathematical model of
punitive damages that separately accounts for the two decisions that comprise a
punitive award,1 54 they find that punitive damages caps have no statistically sig-
nificant effect on the decision of whether to award punitive damages but have a
negative effect on the amount of damages awarded.155 They also find evidence
inconsistent with State Farm having any effect on punitive damages awards.'5 6
Understanding the divergence in the existing evidence with respect to both
State Farm and state-level reforms can elucidate the best way to address punitive
damages going forward. Beginning with the discrepant effects of punitive dam-
ages caps, the best explanation lies in the different types of punitive damages
examined. McMichael and Viscusi consider a national sample of damages,157
while we examine only blockbuster awards here. In theory, punitive damages
caps should affect only the decision of what amount of punitive damages to
award and not the decision of whether to award them because, while caps obvi-
ously limit the amount of punitive damages adjudicators may award, they should
150. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 ("We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages
award cannot exceed."); see TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993) (disclaiming the
creation of any mathematical formula to govern punitive damages).
151. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471,475-76(2008).
152. Id. at 520.
153. Specifically, McMichael and Viscusi analyze data from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts.
McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 90-92.
154. Id.
155. Id at 96. They also find consistent evidence that, by not increasing the evidentiary standards for puni-
tive damages, states can expect to see a greater number of punitive damages awards and a higher average award.
Id at 82.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 89.
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not affect the determination of the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct or
whether a defendant deserves to be punished.158 Thus, in the context of the "typ-
ical" punitive damages awards considered by McMichael and Viscusi, the non-
effect and effect of caps on the decision to impose damages and the decision of
what amount to impose, respectively, is consistent with both the function of caps
and the requirements outlined by the Supreme Court.59
Why, then, does the evidence presented above follow exactly the opposite
pattern, with caps affecting the frequency of punitive damages but not the amount
awarded? Unlike the sample of awards examined by McMichael and Viscusi, we
focus our attention only on awards that exceed $100 million. This high threshold
explains why caps affect the frequency of blockbuster awards and not the fre-
quency of the more typical awards examined in earlier work. If a cap has a bind-
ing effect in a given case, it is exceedingly unlikely that such a case would in-
volve a punitive damages award over $100 million. Thus, the effect of caps on
the frequency of blockbuster awards suggests that caps do, in fact, limit punitive
damages awards by decreasing the chances that any given award will cross the
blockbuster threshold. Similarly, the nature of blockbuster awards (and the high
threshold that must be met to become such an award) explains why caps have
little effect on the amount of damages imposed. Punitive damages caps, almost
invariably, include exceptions that either increase or eliminate the cap in the most
egregious cases. And blockbuster awards are, by definition, the most egregious
cases. Thus, it is not surprising that, conditional on crossing the (very high) $100
million threshold to qualify for blockbuster status, caps have little impact on the
amount of damages awarded.
With respect to the different effect of State Farm, estimated using McMi-
chael and Viscusi's sample of more typical awards and the sample of blockbuster
awards here, the nature of the awards themselves again offers the best explana-
tion. As the Court pointed out in Exxon Shipping, the median and mean ratios
between punitive and compensatory damages are "just 0.62:1 [and] 2.90:1," re-
spectively.160 Therefore, the majority of cases do not even begin to approach
State Farm's ratio limit of 10:1, meaning that State Farm generally has no bind-
ing effect on the cases analyzed by McMichael and Viscusi.161 In stark contrast,
the median and mean ratios for the blockbuster cases are 7.40:1 and 476.54:1,
respectively.16 2 Of the 137 awards we have identified, 44% exceed the State
Farm ratio limit.1 63 Accordingly, it is not surprising that State Farm has a more
salient effect on blockbuster awards since it represents a binding constraint much
158. The Supreme Court has made clear that reprehensibility and worthiness of punishment are the relevant
factors to consider when imposing punitive damages, so the lack of an effect of caps on these factors suggests
that these reforms should not impact the decision of whether to impose punitive damages. Id. at 91.
159. Id. at 96.
160. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499 (2008).
161. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003); McMichael & Viscusi, The
Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 92.
162. Prior to State Farm, the median and mean ratios were 12.26:1 and 717.66:1, respectively. After State
Farm, the median and mean ratios were 2.04:1 and 14.30:1, respectively.
163. See supra Table 1.
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more often in these cases than in others. Indeed, the median ratio between puni-
tive and compensatory damages decreased from 16.88:1 to 3.76:1 following
State Farm, and the mean ratio decreased from 800.35:1 to 46.66:1.164
Overall, the decrease in the frequency of blockbuster awards attributable to
State Farm occurs for the same reason as it does for punitive damages caps-
once constrained, fewer awards are able to cross the blockbuster threshold. With
respect to the amount of punitive damages awarded, however, State Farm con-
tains far fewer exceptions-and possibly no exceptions given the lack of guid-
ance provided by the Supreme Court-than punitive damages caps, meaning that
it remains a binding constraint even on those awards that exceed $100 million.1 65
The different effects of State Farm and punitive damages caps on different
types of punitive damages awards demonstrates that, depending on the precise
structure of a limitation on punitive damages, that limitation may have very dif-
ferent effects. The next Section explores these different structures and makes a
recommendation on how best to address punitive damages in the future based on
the available empirical evidence.
B. Clarifying and Extending the Existing Doctrine
The existing evidence suggests that the structure of a limitation on punitive
damages is important to that limitation's ultimate effect on awards. In particular,
state-level caps are set low enough to constitute a binding constraint on adjudi-
cators awarding punitive damages even in cases where the total amount of dam-
ages is not very high. Caps lose their effectiveness in the most egregious cases,
however, because their exceptions inhibit their ability to constrain punitive
awards.'66 In contrast, the single-digit-ratio limitation announced in State Farm
is not set low enough to bind adjudicators in typical cases where punitive dam-
ages awards are not substantially greater than the accompanying compensatory
damages award. State Farm's limitation, however, contains so few exceptions
that it represents a binding constraint on even the largest awards.167 These differ-
ential effects can be instructive in devising a clearer constitutional doctrine to
govern punitive damages than currently exists under State Farm.
How this should be done depends on whether the losses involve replaceable
financial losses or irreplaceable health impacts, such as fatalities. Specifically,
for financial losses, the Court can achieve its goal of returning predictability to
punitive damages awards by establishing that, only in the rarest cases, may pu-
nitive damages exceed compensatory damages by more than three times, i.e.,
establish a 3:1 ratio limit. In the case of irreplaceable losses, such as the loss of
life in a wrongful death case, the pertinent deterrence value is to set the sum of
compensatory damages and punitive damages equal to the value of a statistical
164. McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 135.
165. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426; Del Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 3, at 151.
166. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425
167. Id.
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life.168 In this Section, we first describe the legal and empirical justifications for
such limits before offering additional insight into how these limits can contribute
to predictability in punitive damages awards.
Before discussing the specifics of our proposed limits, however, it is im-
portant to note that, in establishing these restrictions, the Supreme Court should
abandon all pretext of avoiding a mathematical formula to govern whether a par-
ticular punitive damages award is appropriate under the Due Process Clause.169
The Court nearly did so in State Farm, stating that "in practice, few awards ex-
ceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process."7 0 In extending State Farm to estab-
lish a 3:1 limit, the Court should state that this limit represents a bright-line,
mathematical formula. Our results above suggest that State Farm's success in
limiting blockbuster punitive damages awards i  likely traceable to its lack of
exceptions. By extending State Farm to include an actual bright-line rule, the
Court can solidify this paucity of exceptions and ensure that State Farm remains
effective at reducing punitive damages at all evels of awards.'7' The one excep-
tion that the doctrine should explicitly include relates to wrongful death and
health-related losses. In particular, the 3:1 limit should apply in cases where no
human was physically harmed or killed. In cases of physical injury or death, the
Court should cap total damages at the value of statistical life. This proposal has
been extensively developed by Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi, and we do not
repeat their analysis here.172 Rather, we incorporate it as a specific exception to
the general 3:1 limit we propose. Importantly, including this exception does not
inhibit the predictability of punitive damages under our proposed doctrine be-
cause the value of statistical life is a well-defined formula that can easily be ap-
plied by potential defendants when forecasting their potential liability.1 73
168. See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Saving Lives Through Punitive Damages, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 229,
229-30 (2010) [hereinafter Hersch & Viscusi, Saving Lives].
In this Article, we propose a methodology for setting punitive damages in bodily injury cases that will
enable punitive damages to fulfill their proper deterrence role. The primary focus is on wrongful death
cases, but the approach generalizes to other personal injury contexts. The damages structure we propose to
promote efficient levels of safety uses the value of statistical life ("VSL") to establish the punitive damages
award.
Id; see also W. Kip Viscusi, PRICING LIVES: GUIDEPOSTS FOR A SAFER SOCIETY (2018) (discussing the value of
statistical life more generally).
169. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (noting that the Court "[could] not draw a
mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would
fit every case").
170. 538 U.S. at 425. But see id. (noting that the Court "decline[d] again to impose a bright-line ratio which
a punitive damages award cannot exceed" despite offering a specific ratio to limit punitive damages).
171. See id. This is not to suggest that there should never be an exception to the rule, and the Court may
well want to include language such as "only the rarest of awards exceeding this ratio will satisfy due process."
This language leaves open the possibility that a clearly egregious case may exceed the limit without offering
instructions on how to do so as state punitive damages caps do.
172. See Hersch & Viscusi, Saving Lives, supra note 168, at 238-42 (discussing the specifics of their pro-
posal).
173. Indeed, federal agencies already incorporate the value of statistical life into their decisions. See Mor-
tality Risk Valuation, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/environmental-economics/mortality-risk-valuation (last visited
Nov. 6, 2018) (describing the EPA's approach to the value of statistical life).
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1. The Basis for a New Constitutional Limit: Exxon Shipping
Turning to the specifics of our proposed limits, the legal foundation of these
limits begins with Exxon Shipping.174 There, the Court faced a similar question
of what specific limit to impose, and its approach is instructive here.1'7 At the
outset, the Court rejected the possibility of eliminating outlying punitive dam-
ages awards through verbal instructions or a dollar-amount cap, stating instead
its firm preference for a ratio cap.176 With respect to that ratio cap, the Court
engaged in a detailed analysis to determine that, under maritime law, punitive
damages could not exceed the accompanying compensatory award, i.e., it im-
posed a 1:1 limit on the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.'7 7 While the
Exxon Shipping Court limited its analysis and holding to maritime law,178 its rea-
soning can easily be extended to the due process context to refine the constitu-
tional limits on punitive damages put in place by State Farm.
In Exxon Shipping, the Court arrived at its final holding with respect to the
1:1 ratio after considering three alternative approaches to limiting punitive dam-
ages.179 First, the Court considered using the 3:1 limit that most states had
adopted as part of their statutory punitive damages caps.80 It rejected this ap-
proach, however, because the states that had implemented such a limit "appl[ied]
[it] across the board."'8 t The Court was concerned that such a blanket approach
with a relatively high limit of three times compensatory damages was designed
to accommodate too wide a range of cases involving many different types of
conduct.182 Our proposal is more nuanced than a simple 3:1 limit in that it also
makes provision for establishing deterrence-based amages for cases involving
personal injury. Second, the Court also rejected the 2:1 ratio limit that has be-
come standard in many statutory schemes that allow for the trebling of dam-
ages.'83 In many instances, this limit was based on Congress's desire to induce
private enforcement of statutes by providing financial incentives to potential
plaintiffs," and these concerns were not relevant in the case of punitive damages
174. See generally Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
175. Id. at 501-02.
176. The Exxon Shipping Court began by rejecting the possibility of eliminating outlying punitive damages
awards through verbal instructions, such as those in pattern jury instructions. Instead, the Court noted its prefer-
ence for specific, quantitative limits, such as those in the criminal-sentencing context because criminal sentences
seek to achieve the same goals as punitive damages and because these limits offered the best protections against
arbitrary punishments. Id. at 504-08.
177. Id. at 509-13.
178. Id. at 513.
179. Id. at 503-07.
180. Id. at 510.
181. Id at 510.
182. Id. ("That is, the upper limit is not directed to cases like this one.").
183. Id. at 511.
184. Id ("We know, for example, that Congress devised the treble-damages remedy for private antitrust
actions with an eye to supplementing official enforcement by inducing private litigation, which might otherwise
have been too rare if nothing but compensatory damages were available at the end of the day.").
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under maritime law.'85 Ultimately, the Court decided to rely on empirical evi-
dence in setting the final ratio limit under maritime law.'86 Noting that the evi-
dence suggested, for all cases, a median ratio of punitive to compensatory dam-
ages of less than 1:1,187 the Court reasoned that awards above the median would
be the exceptional ones, such as those involving particularly blameworthy con-
duct or those with low compensatory awards that nonetheless merit punitive
damages.188 Awards below this level (i.e., the median) would exclude "the un-
predictable outlier cases that call the fairness of the system into question."l89
Accordingly, the Court settled on a 1:1 ratio limit in maritime cases, which it
noted would preclude "awards that are unpredictable and unnecessary, either for
deterrence or for measured retribution." 90
Throughout its opinion in Exxon Shipping, the Court was quite clear that it
was sitting as a common law court of last resort and was, therefore, engaging in
a somewhat different analysis than it had when examining punitive damages un-
der the Constitution.19' Nonetheless, the Court's general approach to punitive
damages under maritime law can, with relatively slight modifications, provide
the framework for extending State Farm to better address the predictability of
punitive damages under the Due Process Clause. The Court specifically sought
to achieve the same goals in Exxon Shipping as it has in its line of Due Process
cases, namely the elimination of arbitrary, unfair, and unpredictable awards.192
185. Id. at 512 ("All in all, the legislative signposts do not point the way clearly to 2:1 as a sound indication
of a reasonable limit.").
186. Id. at 512-13.
187. This evidence was developed by Eisenberg et al., Empirical Analyses, supra note 98, at 276.
188. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 512-13.
In a well-functioning system, we would expect that awards at the median or lower would roughly express
jurors' sense of reasonable penalties in cases with no earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness within the
punishable spectrum (cases like this one, without intentional or malicious conduct, and without behavior
driven primarily by desire for gain, for example) and cases (again like this one) without the modest eco-




191. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 501-02.
Today's enquiry differs from due process review because the case arises under federal maritime jurisdiction,
and we are reviewing a jury award for conformity with maritime law, rather than the outer limit allowed by
due process; we are examining the verdict in the exercise of federal maritime common law authority....
Our review of punitive damages today, then, considers not heir intersection with the Constitution, but the
desirability of regulating them as a common law remedy for which responsibility lies with this Court as a
source of judge-made law in the absence of statute.
Id.
192. Id at 499.
The real problem, it seems, is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards. Courts of law are concemed
with fairness as consistency, and evidence that he median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards falls
within a reasonable zone, or that punitive awards are infrequent, fails to tell us whether the spread between
high and low individual awards is acceptable.
Id.
While States possess discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, it is well established that there are
procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on these awards.... The reason is that "[e]lementary
notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not
only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State
may impose."
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And by modifying its approach in Exxon Shipping to suit the due process context,
the Court can achieve predictability in all punitive damages cases without fatally
undermining the ability of punitive damages to punish and deter eprehensible
conduct.
2. Choosing the Appropriate Limit
Returning to the Exxon Shipping Court's three alternatives to limit punitive
damages, it chose the final alternative of a 1:1 ratio based on empirical evidence
because this ratio would exclude many cases that involved particularly blame-
worthy conduct.19 3 While such a goal seems perfectly permissible in the context
of maritime law,19 4 excluding large punitive damages awards warranted by par-
ticularly blameworthy conduct would be a step too far in the due process context.
Indeed, punishing particularly blameworthy conduct with a large punitive dam-
ages award (or, at least, a large award relative to the accompanying compensa-
tory award) is consistent with the purposes of punitive damages.195 Thus, cate-
gorically prohibiting large awards of punitive damages would not be appropriate.
As to the second alternative, the Court rejected imposing a 2:1 limit on the ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages based on statutory frameworks al-
lowing for the trebling of damages because the purpose of damages-trebling-
inducing greater private enforcement of specific statutes-was not relevant in
the context of maritime law. 196 Nothing in the constitutional context differs from
the maritime context in a way that would suggest applying a 2:1 limit in the for-
mer when it was inappropriate in the latter.
That leaves only the first alternative considered by the Exxon Shipping
Court-the 3:1 ratio that was favored by the majority of states that had enacted
a punitive damages cap.197 While the Exxon Shipping Court rejected this alterna-
tive as inappropriate under maritime law,1 98 two compelling reasons support ap-
plying it in the due process context. First, this limitation is strongly supported by
the existing empirical evidence,199 including the evidence presented here. State
Farm's 10:1 ratio limit has generally failed to affect typical punitive damages
awards but has had a substantial and negative influence on blockbuster awards.200
Conversely, state punitive damages caps, which the Court correctly noted are
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-17 (2003) (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996)).
193. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 510-13.
194. Id. at 490.
195. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 ("Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate
interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.").
196. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 511.
197. Id. at 510 ("[T]he upper limit is not directed to cases like this one, where the tortious action was worse
than negligent but less than malicious, exposing the tortfeasor to certain regulatory sanctions and inevitable dam-
ages actions.").
198. Id. at 511-12.
199. McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 93-94.
200. See generally Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 14; Viscusi & McMichael, Shiling the Fat-Tailed Dis-
tribution, supra note 3.
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often centered on a 3:1 ratio but have multiple exceptions, reduce the amount of
punitive damages awarded in typical cases but not blockbuster cases.201 By re-
ducing State Farm's ratio limit to 3:1 for financial losses while maintaining few
exceptions, particularly those for personal injury and wrongful death cases, the
Court can ensure that he constitutional limit on punitive damages is binding in
a wider array of cases.
Second, the Court in Exxon Shipping expressed its strong support for a ratio
limit based on empirical evidence.2 02 Not only do the regression results above
and from other work support a 3:1 ratio limit, but the raw data from blockbuster
awards similarly support such a limitation. In Exxon Shipping, the Court chose a
1:1 ratio because it excluded the most egregious cases based on particularly
blameworthy conduct.2 0 3 Eliminating large punitive awards across all case types
under the Due Process Clause would not be appropriate because doing so would
eviscerate the ability of punitive damages to achieve the goals of punishing and
deterring blameworthy conduct. A 3:1 ratio, however, is obviously higher than a
1:1 ratio and so would still allow many cases involving particularly blameworthy
conduct to pass constitutional muster. More importantly, as an empirical matter,
our proposed 3:1 ratio is remarkably close to the median ratio of 3.76:1 observed
in blockbuster cases following State Farm.20 4 Thus, imposing a 3:1 ratio in the
due process context is justified for the same reasons as imposing a 1:1 ratio in
the more limited maritime context is-it eliminates the unpredictable, outlying
awards while still permitting awards that are designed to punish and deter.2 0 5
Blockbuster cases involve the most egregious conduct, so limiting punitive dam-
ages based on the median blockbuster ratio effectively screens out the most egre-
gious of the most egregious, consistent with the reasoning of Exxon Shipping and
the more general goals of State Farm.20 6
Overall, there is no legal impediment to importing the reasoning from
Exxon Shipping to the due process context, as the Court in both the maritime and
due process contexts has been concerned with the predictability of punitive dam-
ages awards.20 7 And imposing a 3:1 ratio under the Due Process Clause is sup-
ported by similarly strong, if not stronger, empirical evidence as that which sup-
ported the imposition of a 1:1 ratio in maritime law.208 While this limit will
necessarily inhibit the ability of punitive damages to punish and deter in limited
instances, the Court has made clear the importance of predictability in addressing
large punitive damages awards.2 0 9 The next Subsection offers additional insight,
201. McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 94.
202. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 511-13.
203. Id. at 513.
204. Id at 515.
205. Id. at 513.
206. Id. at 512-13; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425-26 (2003).
207. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 507.
208. Id. at 506-07.
209. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (noting that awards satisfying a ratio limit are more likely to comport with
due process "while still achieving the State's goals of deterrence and retribution").
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based on previously developed evidence, as to why our proposed 3:1 ratio limit
will improve the predictability of punitive damages awards.
3. But Will It Work?: Improving Predictability
In one of the earliest empirical entries in the debate over punitive damages,
Eisenberg and colleagues claimed that these damages may be predictable be-
cause the amount of compensatory damages provided substantial explanatory
power as to the amount of punitive damages.2 10 Polinsky pointed out, however,
that even if the amount of compensatory damages explained the amount of puni-
tive damages, an "inability to predict when ... punitive damages will be
awarded" means that these damages remain unpredictable.2 1 1 Polinsky is correct
that predicting punitive damages involves predicting both when they will be
awarded and the amount in which they will be awarded. Moreover, the amount
of compensatory damages is not known in advance at the time of the wrongful
conduct. Thus, even if the level of compensatory damages has a positive statisti-
cal correlation with the value of punitive damages, the injurer must be able to
predict both the level of compensatory damages and its relation to subsequent
punitive damages in order to determine the expected liability costs. Existing ev-
idence suggests that both State Farm and punitive damages caps can reduce the
randomness in this process by decreasing the frequency with which punitive
damages are awarded and the size of the awards that are imposed.212 And, as
explained above, reducing the State Farm ratio limit to more closely approximate
those found in state punitive damages caps will provide for even stronger effects
across the entire range of punitive damages awards.2 13 While reducing the fre-
quency and size of awards does not technically render punitive damages more
predictable on Polinksy's terms, these reductions can nonetheless play an im-
portant role in facilitating the predictability of punitive damages.
In particular, blockbuster punitive damages awards follow a fat-tailed dis-
tribution in which there are extreme outliers at the upper end of the damages
scale.2 14 Accordingly, extremely large awards are much more common than if
these awards followed a normal distribution.2 15 Moreover, at the highest end of
the spectrum, the largest awards can dwarf the next largest awards.2 16 These as-
pects of fat-tailed distributions make predicting large punitive damages awards
exceedingly difficult, and a reduction in the size of these awards alone (even if
unaccompanied by an increase in the ability to predict when they will occur)
makes them inherently more predictable.2 17 Viscusi and McMichael compare
210. Eisenberg et al., Predictability ofPunitive Damages, supra note 87, at 646.
211. Polinsky, supra note 86, at 672.
212. See supra Subsection m.B; see also McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra
note 14, at 93-95.
213. See supra Section V.B.
214. Viscusi & McMichael, Shifting the Fat-Tailed Distribution, supra note 3, at 354-55.
215. Id.
216. Id
217. Id. at 376.
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these awards to natural disasters, which also follow fat-tailed distributions.2 18
Continuing this analogy, consider predicting the yearly damage caused by hurri-
canes. Even if one's ability to predict when hurricanes will occur remains un-
changed, a decrease in the severity of these hurricanes will naturally render pre-
dicting the yearly damage caused by hurricanes easier. This is precisely the type
of reduction-and commensurate increase in predictability-offered by extend-
ing the State Farm decision to impose a 3:1 ratio limit on punitive damages
awards. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Gore recognized this type of increase in
predictability, noting that "[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our con-
stitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice . .. of the sever-
ity of the penalty that a State may impose."219 Our proposed ratio limit can
achieve exactly this.
The 3:1 ratio limit, combined with a well-defined exception for wrongful
death cases, may be broadly consistent with economic theories of punitive dam-
ages in which punitive damages are linked to the probability of detection. Alt-
hough the courts have shown no inclination to embrace this law and economics
theory,220 our proposal is consistent with making some adjustment for a proba-
bility of detection below 1.0. Under the economic theory of punitive damages,
total damages should equal the level of compensatory damages divided by the
probability of detection.2 21 If the probability of detection is 0.25, then total dam-
ages should equal four times the value of compensatory damages, which is what
the 3:1 ratio limit for punitive damages achieves. If the probability of detection
is higher than 0.25, then a 3:1 ratio will lead to larger punitive damages than
specified by the theory. If the probability of detection is lower than 0.25, such as
0.1, then the 3:1 ratio limit would result in lower punitive damages than specified
by the economic theory. Thus, the ratio limit is only excessively constraining for
very low probabilities of detection. Attempting to pinpoint the probability of de-
tection and incorporating it into the punitive damages formula may introduce
additional uncertainty into a damages proposal that is designed to decrease un-
predictability. Given that he case has been brought to trial, the wrongful conduct
has been detected ex post with complete certainty. Ascertaining the probability
of detection that he wrongdoer anticipated at the time of the wrongful conduct
is typically not known with precision and is likely to be a highly speculative
218. Id. at 355.
219. 517 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added).
220. Courts have clearly demonstrated their awareness of the economic theory of punitive damages-spe-
cifically with respect to the need to increase punitive damages to compensate for a low probability of detection
and liability. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 494 (2008) ("Regardless of culpability, however,
heavier punitive awards have been thought o be justifiable when wrongdoing is hard to detect (increasing
chances of getting away with it)."); BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) ("A higher ratio
may also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect."). Despite calls from respected scholars,
however, such as Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 23, at 957-58, courts have declined to bring judicial practice
in line with economic theory. See Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 495-96 (reviewing various approaches to address-
ing punitive damages with no mention of employing economic theory).
221. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 23, at 874.
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exercise. 222 Establishing a 3:1 ratio cap promotes greater predictability with re-
spect to punitive damages, while also accommodating some aspects of the more
general law and economics theory of punitive damages.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Court has not revisited its constitutional doctrine on punitive
damages in several years, these damages awards continue to play an important
role in the legal system. By allowing courts to punish reprehensible behavior and
better achieve the optimal level of deterrence, they can more closely align the
damages in a given case with society's interests. When improperly calibrated,
however, punitive damages can become unpredictable and ultimately violate fun-
damental notions of fairness. Many blockbuster awards are good examples of
this problem, as courts impose large amounts of punitive damages on defendants
who have little ability to predict that their activity will lead to such extreme pun-
ishment.
This Article provides important, novel information on the ways in which
different legal regimes affect blockbuster awards. State Farm, and its single-digit
ratio, reduce both the frequency and size of blockbuster awards, while state pu-
nitive damages caps reduce only the frequency-most likely by preventing
awards that would otherwise have qualified as blockbusters from crossing the
$100 million threshold. While this evidence offers new insight into blockbuster
awards generally, when combined with previous evidence, it offers a unique op-
portunity to examine which interventions into punitive damages awards are most
effective.
Using this insight, we propose a new approach to governing punitive dam-
ages awards under the Due Process Clause. Specifically, by lowering the current
ratio limit from 10:1 to 3:1, coupled with an exception for wrongful death cases,
the Court can realize the benefits of the current doctrine with respect to the larg-
est awards as well as the benefits of punitive damages caps with respect to more
typical awards. Though our proposed doctrine will limit the ability of punitive
damages to punish and deter, the Court has made clear that it is willing to trade
off accomplishing these goals to achieve more predictability in punitive damages
awards. Overall, the evidence suggests that incorporating more elements from
222. Indeed, Viscusi conducted a series of experiments in which potential jurors were provided with in-
structions on how to set punitive damages consistent with economic theory so that the total amount of damages
would achieve optimal deterrence. W. Kip Viscusi, Deterrence Instructions: What Jurors Won't Do, in PUNITIVE
DAMAGES How JUlIES DECIDE 142, 143 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002). However, "[v]ery few of the 353
jury-eligible respondents in [the] sample carried out the basic elements of the deterrence calculation, even though
they had the assistance of a table that gave them multipliers for translating compensatory damages values into
deterrence values." Id. Moreover, "[r]espondents were very insensitive to changes in the probability of detecting
a violation, which should have been the key concern for setting deterrence values based on law and economics
principles," and "respondents were not sensitive to the degree of stealthiness of the defendant's behavior, which
should have been a pivotal factor influencing the punishment value for damages." Id. Thus, even if courts were
inclined to operationalize the economic theory of punitive damages, the process of calculating punitive damages
would be, at best, speculative.
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state punitive damages caps into the constitutional doctrine on punitive damages
can better achieve the aims laid out by the Supreme Court.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Specification and Other Details
To estimate the effect of state reforms on the frequency of blockbuster
awards, we use the following specification:
(1) (Blockbuster case count)st = fl 1(State Farm)t + (Punitive reforms)st 2
+3 (Time trend)t + 8s + E.
In this equation, Blockbuster case count is the number of blockbuster
awards in state s in year t. We control for the effect State Farm may have had on
the number of blockbuster awards across the country. The State Farm indicator
assumes a value of 1 for the year 2004 and all subsequent years. While it was
actually decided in 2003, we allow a grace period to allow for the full implemen-
tation of the decision by lower courts. The vector (Punitive reforms) includes
indicators for the following reforms: punitive damages cap, punitive evidence
reform, and bifurcated trial. (Time trend) is a linear time trend to control for the
growth of punitive damages awards over time. We also include a series of indi-
cators for states, 8, to control for state fixed effects.
To examine the effect of state reforms on the amount of blockbuster puni-
tive damages awarded at trial, we use the following specification:
(2) log(PD)it = fl, log(compensatory damages)ist +fl 2 (State Farm)t
fl3(PD Cap) + f 4Benchit + (Industry)stfls +
fl 6(Litigant Type)ist + (State)st f 7 + E.
In this specification log(PD) is the natural logarithm of the punitive dam-
ages awarded in a given case. Similarly, log(compensatory damages) is the nat-
ural logarithm of the compensatory damages in a given case. The indicator var-
iables State Farm and PD Cap are the variables of interest and equal one when a
case was decided after State Farm and when a case was subject to a state punitive
damages cap, respectively. In addition to including the indicator variables, we
estimate separate models with an interaction between the compensatory damages
variable and these indicator variables. We sequentially add the variables of in-
terest to different models in order to test the robustness of our results.
Bench is an indicator for a bench trial. The vector Industry includes indica-
tor variables for the following industries of defendants: automobile, tobacco, fi-
nance/investment/insurance, nergy/chemical, pharmaceutical/health industries,
and violent crime. While violent crime is obviously not an industry, we control
for whether the case involved the defendant committing some sort of crime. Lit-
igant type is an indicator for whether both business and individual litigants were
involved in a case. The vector State includes indicators for California and Texas
since these states are associated with relatively more frequent and relatively
larger awards.
Throughout our analysis, we exclude four cases from the blockbuster re-
gressions. First, we exclude the two largest cases as outliers: Middleton v. Collins
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and Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco. Additionally, we exclude Garamendi v. Al-
tus Finance, S.A. and Chopourian v. Catholic Healthcare West because the
courts in these cases awarded no compensatory damages, rendering the ratio be-
tween compensatory and punitive damages undefined.
In unreported specifications, we include indicator variables for whether a
state allowed or required bifurcated trials (such that punitive damages are
awarded in a separate phase of trial) and whether a state maintained a lower ev-
identiary burden for punitive damages. These variables are never statistically
significant themselves, and including them has little effect on the variables of
interest.
Results Tables
TABLE Al: EFFECT OF STATEFARMAND PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAPS
ON AWARD FREQUENCY (BLOCKBUSTER CASE COUNT)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables
State Farm -0.138** -0.146*** -0.119**
(0.0558) (0.0560) (0.0568)







Observations 957 957 957 957
R-squared 0.249 0.244 0.252 0.257
Notes: All columns report OLS regression results with the number of blockbuster punitive damages awards in a given
state in a given year as the dependent variable. All specifications include a linear time trend and a full set of state indicator
variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *
significant at 10% level.
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TABLE A2: EFFECT OF STATEFARMAND PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAPS ON
AWARD AMOUNTS (LOG PD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables





PD Cap 0.00661 -0.0158
(0.221) (0.215)
log(CD) x PD Cap 0.000343 0.000518
(0.0121) (0.0116)
log(CD) 0.186*** 0.166*** 0.185*** 0.200*** 0.166*** 0.200***
(0.0503) (0.0514) (0.0502) (0.0516) (0.0517) (0.0520)
Observations 133 133 133 133 133 133
R-squared 0.335 0.310 0.335 0.338 0.310 0.338
Notes: All columns report OLS regression results with the natural log of punitive damages as the dependent variable. All
awards are in 2013 dollars. All specifications include an indicator for business and individual litigants, a vector of indi-
cators for different industries, and indicators for whether a case was decided in Texas or in California. The industry vector
includes indicator variables for the following industries of defendants: automobile, tobacco, finance/investment/insur-
ance, energy/chemical, pharmaceutical/health industries, and violent crime. The excluded industry category is other in-
dustry. All specifications exclude the Garamendi and Chopourian cases which involved no compensatory damages and
the Engle and Middleton cases which involved the two largest PD Awards in the dataset. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
,** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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